The entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia is an absolute necessity. Family archive Entry of ATS troops into Czechoslovakia 1968

14.10.2023 | The world

Alexander Dubcek - first secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (January-August 1968)

In 1968, for almost eight months, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic(Czechoslovakia) was experiencing a period of profound changes, unprecedented in the history of the communist movement. These transformations were a natural result of the growing crisis in this relatively prosperous and developed country, in whose political culture predominantly democratic traditions are deeply rooted. The process of democratization in Czechoslovakia, prepared by reformist-minded forces within the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, went almost unnoticed for a number of years by most analysts and political figures in the West and East, including Soviet leaders. They misinterpreted the nature of the political conflict within the CPC at the end of 1967, which led to the removal in January 1968 of the first secretary of the Presidium of the CPC Central Committee A. Novotny. A. Dubcek, a graduate of the Higher Party School under the CPSU Central Committee, who spoke excellent Russian, was elected instead.

At the end of March, A. Novotny resigned from the post of President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Instead, on the recommendation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the hero of the Second World War, General Ludwik Svoboda, was elected to this post, to whom the Soviet leaders also had no objections.

Novotny's fall was not simply the result of a power struggle within the Czechoslovak leadership, but occurred for a number of reasons, including: economic crisis 1962 - 1963, which awakened the desire for economic reforms, the slow progress of the process of political rehabilitation of the repressed, the open dissent of writers and students, the awakening of reformist-minded intellectual layers in the party, who began the struggle for freedom of thought and expression.

The protracted nature of the political crisis, the stubborn opposition of Novotny and his supporters to Dubcek, a number of scandalous incidents in 1968 (for example, the sensational escape to the United States of General Ian Cheyna, accompanied by rumors of a failed attempt at a military coup in favor of Novotny’s restoration), the weakening of censorship - all this contributed to the mobilization public support for the new leadership. Interested in reform, the leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia included their pluralistic concept of socialism “with a human face” in the “Program of Action” adopted in April 1968 as the “Magna Carta” of the new Dubcek leadership. In addition, Dubcek allowed the creation of a number of new political clubs, and also abolished censorship; in area foreign policy it was decided to pursue a more independent course, which would, however, meet the interests of Warsaw Pact in general and the policies of the USSR in particular.

The amazing speed of events in Czechoslovakia in January - April 1968 created a dilemma for the Soviet leadership. The resignation of Novotny's Moscow-oriented supporters, and especially the reformist programs of the Dubcek leadership and the revival of press freedom, led, from the Soviet point of view, to a dangerous situation in one of the key countries of Eastern Europe. In addition, the leadership of a number of countries participating in the Warsaw Pact thought about the increased, in their opinion, vulnerability of the borders and territory of Czechoslovakia, the prospect of its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, which would result in the inevitable undermining of the Eastern European system military security.

Potentially, the situation in Czechoslovakia could affect neighboring Eastern European countries, and even the Soviet Union itself. The Czechoslovak slogan “socialism with a human face” questioned the humanity of Soviet socialism. " Magna Carta liberties" meant a much greater degree of internal party democracy, the granting of greater autonomy to the state apparatus, other political parties and parliament, the restoration of civil rights (freedom of assembly and association) and a more determined continuation of political rehabilitation, the restoration of national rights of ethnic minorities within the federation, the implementation of economic reform and etc.

Prague. August 1968

The possibility of a “chain reaction” in neighboring socialist countries, where the social upheavals of the recent past were still fresh in memory (GDR in 1953, Hungary in 1956), led to hostility towards the Czechoslovak “experiment” not only of the Soviet, but also of East Germany (W. Ulbricht ), Polish (V. Gomulka) and Bulgarian (T. Zhivkov) leadership. J. Kadar (Hungary) took a more restrained position.

However, the Prague Spring represented a different kind of protest than that which Soviet leaders faced in Hungary in 1956. Dubcek's leadership did not challenge the fundamentals of ensuring the national security interests of the USSR; it did not come up with a proposal to revise the foreign policy orientation of Czechoslovakia. The preservation of membership in the OVD and CMEA was not questioned. Limited pluralism also did not mean a loss of overall control on the part of the Communist Party: power, although somewhat dispersed, would remain in the hands of the reformist party leadership.

From the point of view of the Soviet leadership, events in Czechoslovakia created problems and were potentially dangerous. Having been burned by Hungary, Soviet leaders for a long time could not determine their course in relation to what was happening in Czechoslovakia. Should the changes that have taken place there since January be eliminated or simply limited? What means should be used to influence Czechoslovakia? Should we limit ourselves to political and economic actions or resort to armed intervention?

Despite the fact that the Kremlin was united in its negative attitude towards Czechoslovak reformism, for a long time they were not inclined towards a military invasion. Some members of the Soviet leadership began an intensive search for a peaceful solution to the problem. This became evident after March 1968, when the Soviet government began to use a range of political and psychological pressure to convince Dubcek and his colleagues of the need to slow down the impending changes.

The Soviet side exerted political pressure on Dubcek’s leadership during various meetings and negotiations: at a multilateral meeting in Dresden in March, during a bilateral meeting of the leaders of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in Moscow in May, at unprecedented negotiations at top level between the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in Cierna nad Tisou in July, in Bratislava in August 1968. The Czechoslovak delegation refused to attend the meeting of the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and the USSR in Warsaw (July 1968).

The aggravation of the situation was also facilitated by the initially restrained reaction and then the categorical refusal of the Czechoslovak leadership to accept repeated proposals to station Soviet military contingents on the territory of Czechoslovakia.

Political pressure was accompanied by psychological pressure: large-scale exercises of the Internal Affairs Troops with the participation of the USSR, the GDR and Poland were held near the borders of Czechoslovakia. Later, such a type of psychological influence was used as the presence of troops of the Warsaw Pact countries on the territory of Czechoslovakia during and after military exercises in June and July 1968.

In addition, the Soviet leadership did not exclude the possibility of using economic sanctions against Czechoslovakia as a form of pressure. However, despite reports that appeared at the end of April 1968 about the cessation of Soviet grain supplies, there was no real evidence of the use of economic leverage.

On the night of August 21, 1968, troops from five Warsaw Pact countries (USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany and Poland) were brought into Czechoslovakia. The operation, codenamed "Danube", was aimed at stopping the process of reforms taking place in Czechoslovakia, initiated by the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek - the "Prague Spring".

From a geopolitical point of view, a dangerous situation arose for the USSR in one of the key countries of Eastern Europe. The prospect of Czechoslovakia withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact, which would result in an inevitable undermining of the Eastern European military security system, was unacceptable for the USSR.

Within 36 hours, the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries established complete control over Czechoslovak territory. On August 23-26, 1968, negotiations took place in Moscow between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leadership. Their result was a joint communiqué, in which the withdrawal dates Soviet troops were made dependent on the normalization of the situation in Czechoslovakia.

On October 16, 1968, an agreement was signed between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the conditions for the temporary presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia, according to which part of the Soviet troops remained on the territory of Czechoslovakia “in order to ensure the security of the socialist commonwealth.” In accordance with the agreement, the Central Group of Forces (CGV) was created. The headquarters of the Central Military Command was located in the town of Milovice near Prague. The treaty contained provisions on respect for the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia and non-interference in its internal affairs. The signing of the agreement became one of the main military-political results of the entry of troops of five states, which satisfied the leadership of the USSR and the Warsaw Department.

On October 17, 1968, the phased withdrawal of allied troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November.

As a result of the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia, a radical change in the course of the Czechoslovak leadership occurred. The process of political and economic reforms in the country. In 1969, at the April plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Gustav Husak was elected first secretary. In December 1970, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia adopted the document “Lessons of the crisis development in the party and society after the XIII Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia,” which generally condemned the political course of Alexander Dubcek and his circle.

In the second half of the 1980s, the process of rethinking the Czechoslovak events of 1968 began. In the “Statement of the Leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and Soviet Union"of December 4, 1989 and in the "Statement of the Soviet Government" of December 5, 1989, the decision to send allied troops into Czechoslovakia was recognized as erroneous as unjustified interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.

On December 10, 1989, after the victory of the Velvet Revolution (the bloodless overthrow of the communist regime as a result of street protests in November-December 1989), Czechoslovak President Gustav Husak resigned and a new coalition government of national accord was formed, in which the communists and the opposition received the same number of places. A “reconstruction” of the parliament was carried out, where the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia lost its majority. On December 28-29, 1989, the reorganized parliament elected Alexander Dubcek as its chairman.

August 2018 marked the 50th anniversary of Operation Danube: the introduction of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia to prevent a “counter-revolution.”

In modern realities, the actions of the Soviet Union are usually condemned. This tradition was established back in the period Mikhail Gorbachev, it remains to this day.

To say that Operation Danube was not just a “trick of the USSR”, but the work of Czechoslovakia itself, is practically an attack on the sacred.

Post-war reality: who really built the Iron Curtain?

But the fact is that it is impossible to consider certain events without taking them apart from the time when they occurred. After the defeat Nazi Germany and its allies, the anti-Hitler bloc collapsed. Moreover, the United States, having received the atomic bomb, began to make plans for forceful pressure on the Soviet Union, which lay in ruins and had lost 27 million people in the war.

Facts are stubborn things. Not Joseph Stalin, A Winston Churchill delivered the famous Fulton speech that marked the beginning of cold war. Not Soviet, but American pilots carried out the first combat use atomic weapons, turning Hiroshima and Nagasaki into radioactive dust and ushering in the era of “nuclear blackmail.” Even before the Soviet Union had its own atomic bomb on the table US President Harry Truman there was a plan for massive atomic strikes on the territory of the USSR, which should have claimed tens of millions of lives (and now it is known and not hidden).

The USSR constantly had to respond. Including the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO): a military bloc whose hostile orientation towards Moscow has not been in doubt since the first day of its existence. Today, few people remember that the Soviet Union attempted to join NATO, but was met with refusal, which removed the last questions about what this organization was invented for. And only after this the Warsaw Pact Organization was born: a military structure of socialist countries that acted as a counterweight.

Borders of influence: why Paris and Rome did not become a “red belt”

Soviet leaders were very scrupulous about the dividing lines drawn in Europe on the basis of the agreements of the “Big Three” of the anti-Hitler bloc.

That is why the USSR was silent during the defeat of the communist movement in Greece: this country, according to the decisions made, was classified as part of the sphere of influence of Great Britain.

What can I say: until the second half of the seventies, the USSR had the opportunity to create a “red belt” of pro-Soviet states from the Balkans to the Atlantic, including Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal. The positions of the left, oriented toward Moscow, were strong in these states; there were plenty of periods of unrest and fermentation, but the Kremlin did not inspire any “red revolutions,” preferring to maintain stability.

The “Prague Spring” created a threat of destruction of the existing balance of power from the other side: the liberal wing of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia went far in its desire to get closer to the West. So much so that it began to create a direct threat of Prague falling out of the Warsaw Pact. Moscow tried to prevent this through diplomatic means, but was unsuccessful in this, after which the time came for Operation Danube.

A very strange “occupation”

Today it is known that Western countries provided support to supporters of the Prague Spring through organizing propaganda work. But all talk about military intervention was nipped in the bud. Washington remembered that the USSR was faithful to the “gentleman’s agreement” and did not cross “red lines” in Europe. But there was no doubt that Moscow would not give up even an inch from its “zone of influence.”

Therefore, NATO representatives could wait and hope that Prague would fall into the arms of the West, but under no circumstances would they speed up this process with tanks. The phenomenon of the “Soviet occupation” of 1968 is that there were practically no military operations during Operation Danube. The Czechoslovak army did not take part in the events; minor skirmishes and clashes with civilians in the context of the scale of what was happening were not of key importance.

The losses of Soviet units from road accidents and accidents significantly exceeded those that could be attributed to combat. Stories about dozens of people executed Soviet soldiers Prague residents for some strange reasons are not supported by facts. Another myth is the total rejection by the Czechs of the introduction of Soviet troops. Facts, however, indicate that even within the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia there was a split: First Secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia Vasil Biljak, closest ally Dubcek, opposed the course, which he considered pro-Western, and supported Moscow’s actions.

Preventing the worst

After the Velvet Revolution of 1989, it was no longer common to hear the voices of those citizens of the former Czechoslovakia who believed that in 1968 the country was sliding perhaps towards civil war. What would have happened if Czechoslovakia had left the Warsaw Pact in 1968 and found itself in the Western camp? Those who believe that NATO tanks would not have appeared there would do well to study recent history and see how, after the collapse of the socialist bloc, the North Atlantic Alliance gradually found itself at the walls of Pskov, and soon, perhaps, will stand near Bryansk.

Today it is obvious that the process of NATO's eastward expansion has seriously worsened the international situation. If Operation Danube had not happened, destabilization in Europe could have occurred as early as the late sixties, with all the ensuing consequences. The active period of the “Soviet occupation” of Czechoslovakia ended in September 1968, when the withdrawal of units of the Warsaw Pact countries that participated in Operation Danube from major cities began.

Gusak’s stability: growth in prosperity instead of political freedoms

It is usually said that the introduction of troops stopped reforms and disrupted the development of Czechoslovakia. If we talk about politics, then this is probably true.

But he replaced the leader of the Prague Spring, Alexander Dubcek, in April 1969. Gustav Husak focused on the economy, announcing a "normalization" policy. Thanks to Husak’s course, Czechoslovakia gained a foothold in the top 30 leading world economies by the end of the seventies. Products from Czechoslovakia have always been of high quality and were in great demand not only in socialist countries, but also in Western Europe. Objectively speaking, the majority of residents of Czechoslovakia received an increase in their standard of living instead of political upheaval. Leaving the era of socialism in the late eighties, Czechoslovakia was a developed economic power.

For some reason, it is generally accepted that the Prague Spring would have brought prosperity to the country. But the modern experience of all kinds of revolutions “Rose”, “Gidnost”, “Arab Spring” suggests the opposite: such processes much more often bring about the collapse of state foundations and the economy than something positive.

Opponents will object: the experience of the Velvet Revolution suggests that changes can occur without bloodshed. But here we must take into account that the “Velvet Revolution” was a consequence of the actual capitulation of the Soviet Union in the international arena, when the pro-Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia were literally forced out of the active political life. Those who consider this a natural process should turn to the experience of Ukraine, where people who have a different opinion that does not coincide with the line of the politicians who came to power in 2014 found themselves de facto deprived of their representation in government bodies.

They also forget about one more point: the “Velvet Revolution” led to the collapse of Czechoslovakia as a state. The liberals were unable to do what the communists could: convince the Czechs and Slovaks that living together was more promising than “divorce.” Yes, “velvet”, without shooting, but the separation of Czechs and Slovaks into separate national apartments was the end of the once united Czechoslovakia. We all know well that history is written by the winners. The collapse of the socialist bloc and the Soviet Union led to the fact that in both the Czech Republic and Russia the idea of “suppressing the Prague Spring” became dominant.

In 1968, Soviet tanks entered Prague. The suppression of the Prague Spring became one of the most senseless foreign policy actions of the USSR and one of the most harmful to the image of Russians abroad.

In the 1960s, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia experienced a division into two camps - the conservative one, led by the Stalinist, head of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the country's president Antonin Novotny, and the "reformist" one, which was represented by the first secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia, Alexander Dubcek.

In January 1968, the party congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine elected Dubcek first secretary. Dubcek began reforms: decentralization of power, admission of workers to power, liberalization of the media and the like. He wanted to combine Soviet “socialist construction” with European social democracy. He called it “socialism with a human face.”

In March 1968, the heroes of World War II, the legendary commander of the Czechoslovak Brigade, Ludwig Svoboda, became the country's president. He supported Dubcek's reforms. Thus began the Prague Spring.

Liberalization in Czechoslovakia displeased communist leaders in other countries. The Kremlin was afraid that this would lead to a weakening of the military power of the Warsaw Pact (a defensive pact between the countries of the socialist camp), because the borders of Czechoslovakia bordered on West Germany, which was a member of NATO.

On the night of August 21, 1968, troops from the Warsaw Pact countries began an invasion of the fraternal republic. 300,000 soldiers and 7,000 tanks came to fight the “counter-revolution”. Thus began Operation Danube, the only non-training military action of the Warsaw Pact.

A column of tanks on the way to Prague.

A crushed bus used to block the path of tanks.

Morning of August 21st.Soviet troops on the streets of Prague. Riding on armored vehicles. At this time, the landing force had already captured government buildings. At 10 am, KGB workers loaded the party, government and parliamentary leadership of Czechoslovakia into landing armored personnel carriers, drove them to the airfield, put them on a landing plane and sent them to Moscow.

The Czechoslovak army was ordered not to resist the invasion. But from the very morning the population began to destroy and sketch street signs. Disoriented Soviet troops were not immediately able to capture the radio, train station and newspaper offices. A large crowd had gathered at the radio station in the morning, barricading the street. A Molotov cocktail flew, and bullets responded.

Scene at the radio building. Smoke and fire, the tank is doused with fire extinguisher foam, the crew quickly leaves the vehicle, one tanker covers those who get out. A demonstrator rushes at him: “Come on, shoot!”

During the entire invasion, 108 civilians died. Of these on the first day - 58 Most of them are here, near the radio building

The act of self-immolation committed by Ryszard Siwiec at the Decade Stadium in protest against the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Following R. Sivets, several more people expressed their protest by self-immolation.

Soviet tanks and artillery take up residence on the Vltava embankment

Spontaneous rally. Poster "Never since the USSR!" - A remake of the communist official slogan “Forever with the USSR!”

Demonstration in Prague.

After lunch, the clashes finally stopped and communication began. City residents convinced the soldiers that they did not need “international help”; they had their own socialist party and government.

A familiar scene for Prague and Bratislava at the end of August 1968. “Here, read, here is an appeal from our government...” - “We have an order!”

One of many homemade posters. There was another option: “The technology is great, but there is no culture.”

Poster on the window of a lingerie store

Karlovy Vary, August 21. A group of students on a truck.

Prague, August 22. Soviet armored vehicles surrounded by city residents.

When news of the invasion became known, the Czechoslovak government ordered the army not to resist. Not a single soldier violated this order and fired. But they went to rallies. On the poster: “Nobody called you, occupiers”

Prague, August 29. Students burn Soviet newspapers on Wenceslas Square.

None of the Czech politicians decided to create a “revolutionary government”. The CPSU congress supported Dubcek. The shocked Kremlin agreed to keep his team in power, promising to withdraw the army. In September 1968, Soviet tanks left Prague. But not Czechoslovakia. The so-called “Central Group of Forces” of the USSR remained in the country - 150,000 soldiers. Within a year, Dubcek and Sloboda were dismissed. “Hawks” came to power in the Communist Party of Emergency Situations and began to tighten the screws. The "Prague Revolution" was defeated.

And this victory was the beginning of the end, primarily in the area of the image of the USSR. From the beautiful country of bright people who defeated Nazism and launched man into space, the Union again became a prison of nations. The European "left" has finally turned away from the East, focusing on its own problems. The further advancement of the “proletarian revolution” in the world, which had been going on since 1917, stopped.

Video of troops entering Czechoslovakia

Operation Danube was the largest military campaign for the USSR since World War II. And it became the end for the Soviet Union. The Kremlin no longer talked about any reforms. A long period of “stagnation” began - the bureaucratic apparatus became ossified, corruption flourished, and instead of real actions, the practice of ritual speeches and formal replies appeared. The last leader of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev, tried to change something, but it was too late.

On August 20, 1969, the anniversary of the events in Czechoslovakia, a group of Soviet dissidents made the following statement:

“On August 21 last year, a tragic event occurred: troops of the Warsaw Pact countries invaded friendly Czechoslovakia.

This action was aimed at stopping the democratic path of development that the entire country had embarked on. The whole world watched with hope the post-January development of Czechoslovakia. It seemed that the idea of socialism, discredited during the Stalin era, would now be rehabilitated. The tanks of the Warsaw Pact countries destroyed this hope. On this sad anniversary, we declare that we continue to disagree with this decision, which jeopardizes the future of socialism.

We stand in solidarity with the people of Czechoslovakia, who wanted to prove that socialism with a human face is possible.

These lines are dictated by pain for our homeland, which we want to see truly great, free and happy.

And we are firmly convinced that a people who oppresses other peoples cannot be free and happy.

— T. Baeva, Y. Vishnevskaya, I. Gabay, N. Gorbanevskaya, Z. M. Grigorenko, M. Dzhemilev, N. Emelkina, S. Kovalev, V. Krasin, A. Levitin (Krasnov), L. Petrovsky, L. Plyushch, G. Podyapolsky, L. Ternovsky, I. Yakir, P. Yakir, A. Yakobson"

August 21, 1968 Soviet airborne troops carried out a successful operation to capture key points in the capital of Czechoslovakia.

No matter how much you feed the wolf, he looks into the forest. No matter how much you feed a Czech, Pole, Hungarian or Lithuanian, he will still look to the West. From the very moment of the formation of the socialist camp, concerns about its well-being were entrusted to the country that liberated these countries from fascism. The Russian peasant ate gray bread so that the East German could spread his favorite type of marmalade on a bun. The Russian man drank Solntsedar so that the Hungarian could drink his favorite Tokaji wines. A Russian man rushed to work on a crowded tram so that a Czech could ride in his beloved Skoda or Tatra.

But neither the Germans, nor the Hungarians, nor the Czechs appreciated any of this. The first staged the Berlin crisis in 1953, the second staged the notorious events in Hungary in 1956, and the third staged the so-called Prague Spring in 1968.

It was to eliminate this turmoil that Operation Danube was carried out.

At 2 a.m. on August 21, 1968, advanced units of the 7th Airborne Division landed at the Ruzyne airfield in Prague. They blocked the main facilities of the airfield, where Soviet An-12s with troops and military equipment began to land. The seizure of the airfield was carried out using a deceptive maneuver: a Soviet passenger plane approaching the airfield requested an emergency landing due to alleged damage on board. After permission and landing, the paratroopers from the aircraft captured the control tower and ensured the landing of the landing aircraft.

At 5 o'clock. 10 min. A reconnaissance company of the 350th Parachute Regiment and a separate reconnaissance company of the 103rd Airborne Division landed. Within 10 minutes they captured the airfields of Turany and Namešti, after which a hasty landing of the main forces began. According to eyewitnesses, transport planes landed at the airfields one after another. The landing party jumped off without waiting for a complete stop. By the end of the runway, the plane was already empty and immediately picked up speed for a new takeoff. With minimal intervals, other planes with troops and military equipment began to arrive here.

Using military equipment and captured civilian vehicles, the paratroopers went deep into the territory, and by 9.00 they blocked all roads, bridges, exits from the city, radio and television buildings, telegraph, main post office, administrative buildings of the city and region, printing house, train stations in Brno , as well as the headquarters of military units and military industry enterprises. CHNA commanders were asked to remain calm and maintain order.

Four hours after the landing of the first groups of paratroopers, the most important objects of Prague and Brno were under the control of the Allied forces. The main efforts of the paratroopers were aimed at capturing the buildings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the government, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, as well as the radio and television building. According to a pre-developed plan, columns of troops were sent to the main administrative and industrial centers of Czechoslovakia. Formations and units of the allied forces were stationed in all major cities. Particular attention was paid to protecting the western borders of Czechoslovakia.

The 200,000-strong Czechoslovak army, as 30 years earlier during the capture of the country by the Germans, offered virtually no resistance. However, among the population, mainly in Prague, Bratislava and other large cities, there was dissatisfaction with what was happening. Public protest was expressed in the construction of barricades on the path of the advance of tank columns, the operation of underground radio stations, the distribution of leaflets and appeals to the Czechoslovak population and military personnel of the allied countries. In some cases, there were armed attacks on military personnel of the contingent of troops introduced into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the throwing of petrol bombs at tanks and other armored vehicles, attempts to disable communications and transport, and the destruction of monuments to Soviet soldiers in the cities and villages of Czechoslovakia.

On August 21, a group of countries (USA, England, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay) spoke at the UN Security Council demanding that the “Czechoslovak issue” be brought to a meeting of the UN General Assembly, seeking a decision on the immediate withdrawal of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries. Representatives of Hungary and the USSR voted against. The governments of socialist-oriented countries - Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania and China - condemned the military intervention of five states.

On October 16, 1968, an agreement was signed between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the conditions for the temporary presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia, according to which part of the Soviet troops remained on the territory of Czechoslovakia “in order to ensure the security of the socialist commonwealth.” The treaty contained provisions on respect for the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia and non-interference in its internal affairs. The signing of the agreement became one of the main military-political results of the entry of troops of five states, which satisfied the leadership of the USSR and the Warsaw Department.

On October 17, 1968, the phased withdrawal of allied troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November.

Despite the fact that there were no military operations during the deployment of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries, there were losses. Thus, during the redeployment and deployment of Soviet troops (from August 20 to November 12), 11 military personnel, including one officer, were killed as a result of the actions of hostile persons; 87 Soviet military personnel were wounded and injured, including 19 officers.

Many are now asking the question: why was it necessary to keep all these Czechs, Poles, Germans and Hungarians in the socialist camp? But if we allowed all of them to fall under the West, American military bases would immediately appear on our borders. And therefore, in Poland we were forced to maintain the Northern Group of Forces, in the GDR - the Western, in Hungary - the Southern, and in Czechoslovakia - the Central.

MEMORIES OF OPERATION PARTICIPANTS

Lev Gorelov(in 1968 - commander of the 7th Guards Airborne Division):

There is no such thing in the Airborne Forces regulations; it is not intended to fight in cities. In the combined arms regulations, where the infantry are, there is also nothing there - “peculiarities of combat operations”...

What to do? The guys from the villages, some of them have never even been in the houses, don’t know what a multi-storey building is.

I gathered retired veterans who once took settlements during the war. We are writing temporary instructions for taking over the house. Houses are like houses, not on a global scale, but like taking a large house. We are withdrawing the division and regiments, but the regiments stood separately, and in each city there are microdistricts. So here we are at dawn, until people come home from work, we were training there - we were practicing the capture of a populated area. And this is a different tactic: an assault detachment, a support detachment, fire support, cover squads - this is a whole new tactic for paratroopers, and for everyone. Take locality- is to create assault groups necessary. I’ve been training for a month, they say: “The division commander has gone crazy, what’s wrong, they took everyone out, from morning to night, until the working class arrived, they stormed…”

What saved us from bloodshed? Why did we lose 15 thousand of our young guys in Grozny, but not in Prague? Here's why: there were detachments ready there, ready in advance, Smarkovsky was in charge, an ideologist. They formed detachments, but they did not issue weapons, weapons on alert - come, take the weapon. So we knew, our intelligence knew where these warehouses were. We captured the warehouses first, and then we took the Central Committee, the General Staff, and so on, the government. We devoted the first part of our efforts to warehouses, then everything else.

In short, at 2 hours 15 minutes I landed, and at 6 hours Prague was in the hands of the paratroopers. The Czechs woke up in the morning - to arms, and our guards were standing there. All.

— So, there was no resistance?

- Only in the Central Committee. This means that 9 Czechs in the Central Committee were killed by ours. The fact is that they went through the basements and came out on the opposite side, the corridor is long, you know, these are service rooms. And our guard stood in Dubchik’s office, and the machine gunner was sitting 50 meters before this office and saw them coming, running with machine guns. He took aim and fired. He then unloaded the entire belt with a machine gun, killed them, and then the Czechs were taken away by helicopter. I don’t know where they buried him.

NIKOLAY MESHKOV(senior sergeant of motorized rifle regiment PP 50560):

Regiment commander Colonel Klevtsov, combat commander, participant of the Great Patriotic War, also a participant in the Hungarian events, said: “I have learned from the bitter experience of the Hungarian events; many soldiers were killed because of the “don’t shoot” orders. And we were given the order to defend the socialist gains in Czechoslovakia and we will defend them with weapons in our hands, and for every shot from their side, we will respond in kind.”

The first 50 kilometers passed without incident. Passing at about 2 o'clock in the morning some settlement where one of the military units of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was located, we saw that soldiers were withdrawing tanks and vehicles on combat alert. We heard the first machine gun bursts about 40 kilometers short of Prague. Each of us immediately found his helmet, half of the soldiers went down inside the armored personnel carrier. All the soldiers attached the horn to their machine gun and cocked it. The soldier's jokes were put aside.

The city greeted us warily. There are no signs around, the streets are narrow. There are 10-15 storey buildings everywhere. The tank in such a place looked like a matchbox. Almost a kilometer later, the first obstacle stood in the way of the cars - a barricade of cars and buses, all of Soviet production. Our column stopped. From some building, from above, automatic weapons fire began. The bullets clicked against the armor of the armored personnel carrier, and we were blown inside the vehicle as if by the wind. In response, we also opened fire from machine guns. No harm done. The lead tank was ordered to fire a blank charge to clear the road. The shot rang out suddenly, breaking the silence early morning. The barricade of cars shattered, some cars overturned and caught fire. The column moved on.

... The road ran along the river, and on the left there were high-rise buildings. The road was very narrow; two tanks on it would not have been able to pass each other. A kilometer and a half later, at a turn, a crowd of armed people appeared, hiding behind small children. They opened fire on us. The front tank began to move to the right, so as not to run over the children, broke the parapet and fell into the river. None of the crew made it out, everyone died, but at the cost of their lives they saved the children. Then people began to run home, and we pushed the armed militants back with fire. Three of them died, and we had two wounded and a dead crew...

On the way to Prague there were two barricades of cars and buses, and also all the equipment was Soviet, where did they get so much of it? A BAT moved ahead of the column with a cleaner and cleared the barricades like a pile of garbage. We were fired at three more times from the houses... An armored personnel carrier caught fire behind us, 40 meters later another one, soldiers jumped out of the cars. A mixture in cellophane was dropped from the windows of the armored personnel carrier, when upon impact the cellophane burst, the mixture immediately ignited like gasoline, the commanders said that this fire could not be extinguished... Having reached the government residence with losses at about 7 a.m. and surrounded it from all sides, we did not We saw not a single paratrooper, there were none. As it turned out later, for some reason they were delayed for almost three hours, and got to their destination using whatever they could. In total, the convoy of motorcycles they arrived on amounted to 100 units. But they were immediately taken to other lines, their task was completed by our unit.

On the northern side there was a regiment of Germans, next to them were Hungarians, and a little further on were the Poles.

By 8 a.m. the city woke up as if on cue, deafened by explosions and machine gun fire. All Allied troops entered the city 6 hours earlier than expected.

The city has healed military life, military patrols appeared. The shooting in the city did not stop, but increased every hour. We could already clearly distinguish where our machine gun was firing and where someone else’s, the shots of our guns and the explosions of alien shells. Only the fan of bullets could not be distinguished; it was the same in flight. The first pickets, students, appeared. They went on strike, then launched an assault; we could barely hold back the onslaught. The howitzer was captured, and our platoon repelled the gunners.

... An incident remains in my memory: Czechs who spoke Russian well came out of the crowd and suggested that we get out of their land in an amicable way. A crowd of 500-600 people became a wall, as if on command, we were separated by 20 meters. From the back rows, they lifted four people in their arms, who looked around. The crowd fell silent. They showed something to each other with their hands, and then instantly pulled out short-barreled machine guns, and 4 long bursts thundered. We did not expect such a trick. 9 people fell dead. Six were wounded, the shooting Czechs instantly disappeared, the crowd was dumbfounded. The soldier in front, whose friend had been killed, emptied his clip into the crowd. Everyone dispersed, carrying away their dead and wounded. This is how the first death came to our “gunners”. Later we became smarter, we rounded up all the strikers and checked everyone for weapons. There was not a single case where we did not confiscate it, 6-10 units each time. We transferred people with weapons to headquarters, where they were dealt with.

The week of fighting and shooting left its mark. One day, when I woke up in the morning, I looked in the mirror and saw that I had gray temples. The experiences and death of our comrades made themselves felt... Somewhere on the fifth day in the morning, a kilometer away from us, a machine gun hit with heavy fire. Bullets clattered along the walls, showering streams of sand. Everyone fell to the ground and covered their heads with their hands and began to crawl. The order was received to suppress the firing point. The machine gun hit, not allowing anyone to raise their heads; the bullets, ricocheting on the paving stones, made a buzzing sound that made the heart skip a beat. I felt something hot in my right leg, crawled around the corner, and took off my boot. It was torn, there was blood all over the footcloth. The bullet tore through the boot and cut the skin on the leg, essentially a scratch. I wrapped it in a bag and gave an injection. There was no pain as such, I was lucky. Accepted baptism of fire. The guys from the second company, and they were grenade launchers, suppressed the firing point. With one salvo of a grenade launcher, the 4-story building from which the fire was fired became 3-story, one floor collapsed completely. After such a shot, we are filled with pride in the power of our weapons.

... Somewhere on the twentieth day of hostilities, the fighting began to subside, only minor skirmishes occurred, although there were some killed and wounded.

I will describe one more case. One day in September 1968, our company was sent to unload food for the army. 4 railway refrigerators arrived, loaded with pork and beef carcasses, 2 wagons of butter, sausages, stewed meats and cereals. Before unloading, our doctors checked the food for suitability; it turned out that all the meat and other food was poisoned, although all the seals and documents were accompanied by yatsel. The train was moved further from the city, into a field. The military dug trenches. We, wearing chemical protection, unloaded food into the pits, poured diesel fuel on them and set them on fire. Everything was razed to the ground... There was a real war going on...

Alexander Zasetsky (in 1968 - radio platoon commander, lieutenant):

The Czech people greeted us differently: the adult population was calm, but wary, but the youth were aggressive, hostile and defiant. She was heavily “processed” by hostile propaganda. Prague was full of Westerners at that time; they were later caught and expelled. There were mainly attacks, shootings, and burning of cars and tanks from young people. On our tanks, two barrels of fuel were attached above the engine compartment, so they jumped on the tank, pierced the barrels and set them on fire. The tank was on fire. Then there was an order to remove the barrels. There were, of course, human losses. Radio operator Lenya Pestov worked with me on the helicopter, sorry I don’t know from which unit. A few days later, when he was not visible, he asked - where is Lenya? They say he died. The helicopters we were flying on were fired at multiple times. Some were shot down. People were dying. I remember a helicopter carrying journalists was shot down. Two journalists and the pilot were killed.

Although I remember other moments of my combat life back then with pleasure. Near our location there was an estate with a large luxurious garden. Autumn. Everything is ripe, there are a lot of fruits. To avoid the temptation to eat from the garden, the commander organized security for this estate. When everything has calmed down a bit, an elderly Czech man arrives in a three-wheeled car and asks permission to harvest the garden. “If there is anything left,” as he put it. Imagine his surprise when he saw that everything was intact, everything was in perfect order, and a squad of soldiers was assigned to help him clean up. The moved elderly Czech burst into tears and thanked him for a long time.