Playa Giron is a memorable symbol of Cuban independence. American Shame in the Bay of Pigs

Audio, photo, video at Wikimedia Commons

Operation at the Bay of Pigs, landing at the Bay of Pigs, operation "Zapata"- a military operation prepared by the US government since 1960 to overthrow the government Fidel Castro on the Cuba.

background

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Evolution of the nature of the operation

(a) the creation of a unified Cuban opposition; (b) the deployment of a radio station for "gray" broadcasting to Cuba on short and long waves; (c) the continued establishment of an intelligence and subversive network in Cuba; (d) continued preparations for the establishment of a paramilitary force outside of Cuba.

In fact, at this stage, a combination of partisan actions and psychological warfare. The CIA immediately began training 300 guerrillas, first in the US and Panama Canal Zone and then to Guatemala. Radio station on Bolshoi Island cisne began operating on May 17 using equipment left on the island after being used for radio propaganda as part of PBSUCCESS operations. In June, the CIA managed to form from the fragmented Cuban opposition (184 groups according to the calculations of the CIA itself) Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front(KDRF).

In the fall of 1960, the CIA realized that guerrilla warfare might not reach the critical mass needed for an uprising against Castro, and the nature of the operation began to change from guerrilla warfare to amphibious landings. In September, a military adviser appeared in the WH / 4 group involved in the preparation of the operation - Colonel of the Marine Corps J. Hawkins (English)Russian . In the CIA correspondence on October 31, 1960, it was indicated that, according to a plan not yet approved, the sabotage group would be no more than 60 people, and at least 1,500 people in several battalions, and possibly US special forces, would participate in the landing operation.

After the failure of landing and resupply operations for guerrilla groups in October 1960, at a meeting at the White House on November 29, the CIA proposed a new plan for approval by the president, who was clearly irritated by Castro's persistence in Cuba. Nobody in the audience objected to the new approach; Eisenhower still demanded that "America's hand not be seen." The decision to use amphibious landings, like many others, was not written down on paper; as in other cases, the president did not get involved in the details of covert operations, which was necessary to preserve their ability to plausible deniability.

On January 4, 1961, the CIA presented a new plan, according to historian P. Gleichesis (English)Russian , "the most realistic" and much more thoughtful than the later Trinidad and Zapata plans. The plan included the following sequence of actions:

  • landing of 750 people captures a small bridgehead in Cuba. The purpose of the landing will be to survive and hold a bridgehead in conditions of complete air superiority. The document clearly stated that the operation should not be carried out if there were no opportunities for tactical air support and proposed the use of airfields in Florida, making impossible the illusion of American non-intervention;
  • The CIA expected a general uprising against Castro to begin within a few weeks of the landings and be successful within a few more weeks. Until such an uprising begins, the landing force should not attempt to expand the bridgehead;
  • if the uprising does not start, then a provisional government will be landed on the bridgehead, which will be recognized by the United States and possibly other Latin American countries and will ask for help. This assistance will be provided in the form of direct US military intervention.

Under Eisenhower, the US military was used solely for support and was not used in planning; although representatives Chiefs of Staff Committee and were present at all key meetings and did not object, they were never asked to evaluate the plans of the CIA or the quality of the training of the paratroopers. Kennedy immediately involved the military in discussing plans, revealing significant differences in positions at a meeting on January 28, 1961. Plans reported to the President changed at this point: Richard M. Bissell (English)Russian , who was responsible for planning the operation, in a memo dated February 8, Kennedy spoke of the optimism of the CIA and the Department of Defense about the invasion: "in the worst case, the landing force will be able to break into the mountains, and in the best, deploy a large-scale civil war where we can openly support Castro's opponents." At the same time, diplomat T. Mann (English)Russian believed that there were no chances for a quick uprising against Castro, and the United States would essentially have to choose between the loss of the landing force, the difficulties of supplying guerrillas in the mountains, and direct intervention.

Plan "Trinidad", recommended by the CIA on March 11, 1961, included the capture and holding of a bridgehead near the city Trinidad, repulsing the attacks of the Cuban militia and creating the conditions for a large-scale uprising. In case of failure, the paratroopers were to withdraw to the nearby mountains and move on to guerrilla war. The plan was silent about how the paratroopers - after the defeat on the bridgehead - would make their way to the mountains through the environment, but noted that "the provisional government should be landed immediately after the capture of the bridgehead." In the event of a successful operation, the government was supposed to recognize and thereby create conditions for at least non-state material support. Kennedy rejected the plan, demanding that it be replaced with a less ambitious one that could more plausibly look like a purely Cuban operation.

  • a smaller version of the Trinidad, with a night landing without airborne assault and air support;
  • landing on the northeast coast of Cuba;
  • landing in the Bay of Pigs, which by March 16 had become the Zapata plan.

US domestic political considerations

Shortly after Eisenhower's approval of the amphibious assault plan, there was a change of administration in the United States, and Kennedy. By the time the new president came in, the practical details had not been clarified, and after the disaster, Eisenhower justified himself by saying that he was only training a small number of Cubans, "despite a lot of talk, there were no plans yet with a specific number, landing site or support" .

Kennedy was informed about the preparation of the operation during the election campaign. After his victory in the election, in November 1960, Dulles and Bissell informed the future president about the details of the operation, Kennedy did not object, and preparations continued. However, key members of the future administration were not briefed, and Kennedy did not request further information. As a result, according to T. Mann, who unsuccessfully tried to arrange the transfer of cases between administrations, it turned out “stupidity - as if it [the operation] will disappear if it is not dealt with. Kennedy tried to ignore it when he still had many months to think."

The above-mentioned CIA plan of January 4, 1961 explicitly mentioned the need to obtain the consent of the new president for air support for the landing.

Kennedy's hands were tied by his campaign stance in confrontation with Castro. During the campaign, he attacked Eisenhower for admitting the possibility of a communist threat "90 miles from the United States." This position attracted voters to him, but, after coming to power, made the cancellation of the operation almost impossible; according to Robert Kennedy, “everyone would say he chickened out… that was Eisenhower's plan; Eisenhower's people were confident of success."

Kennedy himself preferred a strategy of gradually building up guerrilla warfare and repeatedly expressed this, but the CIA assessed such actions while impossible, including because of the position of Cuban emigrants prepared for the landing, who believed that an open attack had better chances for a direct military attack. US support. Unconvinced by the CIA's assessments, Kennedy hesitated, but the preparations for the operation proceeded on their own, and the delay brought the president closer to approving the landing.

Kennedy continued to have doubts about the chosen plan of operation. So, on April 4, he again reported that he would prefer to see an invasion force of 200-250 people; The CIA again replied that this was impossible.

"Phase Two"

In February 1961, discussion of what would happen after the landing and capture of the beachhead (the so-called "Phase 2") was practically abandoned, despite disagreements between Bissell and Mann. Bissell later justified this by saying that planning for the subsequent stages in covert operations is usually incomplete, since the outcome of the first phase is usually difficult to predict: "we did not agree on what to do after the establishment of a beachhead."

Disagreements about phase 2 were not only between the CIA and the State Department, but also within the CIA. Bissell and those around him in the CIA believed that if the landing force could hold out for a few days, they could hold out for a month, and in the meantime, while Castro could not retake the beachhead, the rebel air forces controlled the sky, bombed without interruption and with increasing efficiency - something will happen. However, at the same time, Hawkins believed that the brigade would attract young people, strengthen and go to Havana, and Bissell himself thought that the more likely options were to recognize the interim government and directly support it either from the United States or OAS. Mann's disbelief in the possibility of any success in phase 2 did not go beyond the memorandum: being essentially alone, at the decisive moment he did not object to the landing - but was eager to stop his participation in the planning of the operation and left Washington before the landing; at the time of the disaster, Mann was ambassador to Mexico.

In fact, there was a fundamental difference between the views of the President and the CIA in assessing what would happen if the landing did not develop according to an optimistic scenario: Dulles and Bissell believed that, given a choice between failure of the operation and direct US military intervention, the President would choose open invasion of Cuba. Kennedy repeatedly made it clear during the planning process that he would not issue such an order, but Bissell in particular assumed that, faced with the possibility of failure, Kennedy would change his mind. According to P. Gleichesis, Kennedy and the CIA at that moment resembled ships that diverged at night in different courses, but did not understand this. To get the plan approved by the president, the CIA kept describing the possibility of the amphibious going over to guerrilla warfare and thus the impossibility of a total failure, when in fact it didn't even plan for that option (singing a "lullaby" for the president, according to Gleichesis).

Preparing for an invasion

The preparations took place in complete secrecy, in the words of Eisenhower himself, "everyone had to be ready to swear that he had not heard anything about it." The planning of the operation was carried out similar to PBSUCCESS, a special unit within the Directorate of Plans. (English)Russian , practically without the participation of the Directorate of Intelligence.

General management of the operation (received the code name operation " Pluto » ) was carried out by CIA Director Allen Dulles. Responsible for the development and implementation of the operation was General Richard M. Bissell, who served as CIA Deputy Director for Planning (English)Russian . In doing so, Dulles gave Bissell wide discretion in operational matters. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Whiting Willauer coordinated the State Department's preparations for the invasion. The head of the project (WH / 4 group) inside the CIA was J. Esterline (English)Russian .

At the same time, significant efforts were made to consolidate the political opponents of Castro (who had already created about 60 associations and groups). As a result, the "Democratic Revolutionary Front" ("Democratic Revolutionary Front") was created. Frente”), which included five groups, Manuel A. Verona became its leader.

In November 1960, under the pretext of "protecting Nicaragua and Guatemala from a possible attack from Cuba," the United States sent a group of US Navy warships to the coast of Cuba, which was the next stage of preparation for the landing operation in the Bay of Pigs.

The preparations for the operation did not go unnoticed. Separate references to the military training of Cuban emigrants appeared in the open press. Dec. 31 1960 at the session UN General Assembly and 4 January 1961 at the meeting United Nations Security Council Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Castro Roa made a statement about the preparation by the American intelligence services of an armed invasion of Cuba.

After taking office as president J.F. Kennedy , January 20th 1961 A. Dulles and R. Bissell acquainted him with the plan of the landing operation (“ Operation Trinidad”), and the president expressed the wish that the plan be further studied by Pentagon experts. January 26 a meeting was held, as a result of which a slightly modified version of the operation plan was approved, which provided for an increase in the number of paratroopers from 800-1000 to 1443 people, providing them with bulldozers and tools for preparing a field airfield, as well as additional weapons.

On April 8, 1961, a radio message was broadcast to the Cuban people and governments of Latin American countries calling for an armed struggle against Castro.

fighting

Sabotage and sabotage

Before the start of the operation in Cuba, the " fifth column» opponents of the Cuban revolution (who received the contemptuous nickname among the revolutionaries « gusanos », Spanish gusanos- letters. "worms").

Events April 14-16

April 14, 1961 American reconnaissance aircraft U-2 took photographs of Cuban airfields, as a result of which the location of 15 out of 24 Cuban aircraft was established.

As a result of Cuban anti-aircraft fire, two B-26s were damaged - one of them fell into the sea 50 km north of Cuba (the crew of two people died), the second damaged aircraft landed at an air base in key west, but later did not take part in the operation.

A third B-26 landed at an international Miami airport. The pilot of this plane made a statement that he and his associates are deserters from the Cuban Air Force, after which he turned to the US authorities with a request for political asylum. However, the disinformation mechanism did not work, as the invited journalists noticed the differences between the landed version of the B-26 and those that were in service with the Cuban Air Force, and drew attention to the fact that, contrary to the story of the pilots, the bomber's machine guns were not used (the barrels were clean). The incident caused significant international outcry.

A second raid on Cuba was canceled by order of President J.F. Kennedy.

The fleet of the "Cuban Expeditionary Force" consisted of two landing ships (LCI " Blagar" and LCI " Barbara J"") and five cargo ships - "Houston" (code designation " Aguja”), “Rio Escondido” (code designation “ Ballena”), “Caribe” (code designation “ Sardinia”), “Atlantico” (code designation “ Tiburon) and Lake Charles. Radars and anti-aircraft machine guns were installed on landing ships, and anti-aircraft guns were installed on transport ships.

Landing operation and battle at Playa Giron

A fragment of a US combat aircraft shot down by Cuban air defenses during the fighting with the landing of Cuban counter-revolutionaries in the Bay of Pigs. Cuba, April 1961. State Central Museum of Contemporary History of Russia

Around 07:30, six military transport aircraft (five C-46 and one C-54) in accordance with the Sokol plan, they dropped the 1st airborne battalion of the “2506 brigade” (177 people) in the San Blas area.

By 11 o'clock, the two remaining transports of the "brigade 2506" withdrew to the open sea.

On the evening of April 17, more than 2,000 122-mm shells were fired at the landing, but shelling of a long and narrow front turned out to be ineffective, since the paratroopers had already dug in.

The bombers were supposed to escort US jet fighters from the aircraft carrier Wessex, but the aircraft missed each other, and two B-26s with crews of US citizens (pilots of the Alabama National Guard) were shot down by the Cuban Air Force.

At the same time, the Nicaraguan dictator Somoza proposed to use six fighters for air support P-51 Mustang Air Force of Nicaragua (on which they began to paint over identification marks), but this decision was rejected.

On the same day, Cuban T-34-85 tanks destroyed two tanks of the Brigade 2506.

In the afternoon, two American destroyers, USS Eaton (code Santiago) and USS Murray (code designation Tampico) approached the coast of the Bay of Pigs in order to evacuate the personnel of the invasion forces, however, after several shots in their direction from tank guns, the ships left for the open sea.

Air Force and Air Defense of Cuba shot down 12 aircraft B-26 "Invader" , C-46 and other types that provided cover for the landing, including several with crews of US citizens. Of these, 7 B-26s and 1 C-46 were shot down by Cuban fighters, who suffered no losses.

The Cuban government estimated the damage caused to the country by the invasion at $53 million. In April 1962, the Husanos prisoners from Brigade 2506 were tried and handed over to the United States in December 1962 in exchange for a $53 million shipment of medicines and food, which were provided by the US government, but made on behalf of charitable foundation "Tractors for Freedom Committee" .

Subsequent events

The failure of the operation caused a significant resonance in the US and internationally. AT Cairo , Jakarta , Rio de Janeiro and Lima Demonstrators attempted to storm US diplomatic missions.

At the UN meeting, representatives of 40 countries condemned the US aggression against Cuba.

The government of the USSR condemned the armed invasion and sent a note of protest to the United States calling for measures to stop the aggression against Cuba.

In 1986, representatives of the US scientific community (American historians Howard Zinn, William Appleman Williams (English)Russian , Gabriel Kolko (English)Russian , Lloyd Gardner (English)Russian , David Horowitz and others) recognized that the US operation in 1961 was US interference in the internal affairs of Cuba, an act of US aggression against Cuba, and a direct violation of Article 18 of the charter of the Organization of American States, under which the US signed in 1948, prohibiting anyone nor was to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. The text of the expert opinion was published in full in The Nation.

Review by General Maxwell Taylor

On April 22, 1961, President Kennedy demanded that General Maxwell Taylor, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and CIA Director Allen Dulles form a Cuba Study Group to investigate the failure of the operation. On July 13, General Taylor sent the report of the commission of inquiry to President Kennedy. The reasons for the defeat, according to the compilers of the report, were related to the lack of early deployment, the inability to succeed by covert means, and insufficient air support (insufficient number of pilots involved and air strikes), an insufficient amount of weapons and ammunition provided to the “2506 brigade”, flooding of the ships of the brigade .

Declassified US government documents show that after the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation, the US continued to consider and prepare a direct military invasion of Cuba.

According to the report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States ( Operation Northwoods) On March 13, 1962, a number of provocations were supposed to be used as a reason for direct military intervention in Cuba, in particular:

  • 1. Sabotage in and around the American military base in Guantanamo (as examples were considered: arson of an aircraft and flooding of a ship; it was necessary to publish a list of non-existent "dead" in the media).
  • 2. The sinking of the ship with Cuban refugees.
  • 3. Organize terrorist attacks in Miami, other cities in Florida and Washington, directed at Cuban refugees. Arrest "Cuban agents" and publish fake "documents".
  • 4. Carry out an air raid on the territory of states adjacent to Cuba.
  • 5. Simulate attacks on passenger planes and shoot down an unmanned American plane or blow up a radio-controlled ship. To simulate attacks, use the F-86 Saber fighter repainted under the "Cuban MIG". It was also planned to publish in the newspapers a list of those killed in a downed plane or a blown up ship.
  • 6. Simulate the downing of a US military aircraft by a Cuban MiG.

Each incident was supposed to be blamed on the Cuban government.

"Gusanos"

Declassification of documents

Memory

Entrance to the operation museum

Later, an operation museum was opened in Playa Giron, at the entrance to which one of the Cuban Air Force aircraft was installed (" Sea Fury"), who participated in the operation. Along the entire road along which Cuban troops marched to Playa Giron, memorials were erected at the places where soldiers died during the bombing. obelisks. The victory is celebrated annually on April 19, in its commemoration, Air Force and Air Defense Day is set on April 17, and April 18 is Tankman Day. In July 1961, the Council of Ministers of the country established Order of Playa Giron- one of the highest state awards of Cuba.

Reflection in literature, art and journalism

Operations in the Bay of Pigs are devoted to a number of literary and artistic works, films, paintings.

On the coast of Cuba there is a pool that intrigues with its name. What became famous for the Bay of Pigs and why it is so named, the material will tell.

Spanish riddle

Matanzas is one of the largest provinces in the Republic of Cuba. There are dozens of factories working with sugar cane and several oil refineries on the territory. Due to this, the zone is considered the most industrialized region of the country. The capital of this province is the city of Matanzas.

However, most of the tourists who had to visit the Island of Liberty (as Cuba is called) remembered the province of Matanzas thanks to the beautiful beaches. One of the most exotic corners of this region is the Bay of Pigs, which is better known as the Bay of Pigs. This pool is located on the southern coast of Cuba, which overlooks the Caribbean Sea.

From Spanish, the name of the bay sounds Bahía de Cochinos and translates as "Bay of Pigs". However, in fact, the nickname is not associated with animals. This is a homonym, that is, a word that is different in meaning, but the same in sound. Therefore, from another translation, Cochino is the name of a tropical sea fish that is found in this area. The second name of this species is the Royal triggerfish.

Background of the uprising

However, for most people who are interested in history, the Bay of Pigs serves as an example of international military strategy. Why the bay is called so, experts do not care today. Instead, they want to know more details about the operation that took place on this island in 1961.

This unique event was due to the fact that Fidel Castro and his supporters seized power in Cuba. The previous dictator Batista was forced to flee. Together with the former ruler, officials and rich people left the island, most of whom took refuge in Miami and Florida (USA). The intelligentsia and the middle class were afraid of persecution and did not want to part with their acquired property.

If the top of the country did not support the new leader, then the poor liked him. Castro confiscated the land and property of the bourgeoisie and distributed it to the people. Therefore, his policy immediately took the side of the ideas of communism.

Preparing for an attack

In this regard, the CIA began to organize an attack that took place in the Bay of Pigs (Bay of Pigs). What became famous for this pool and why the operation became a failure is described below.

America did not want Castro and his country to take the side of the Soviet Union. It was decided to take advantage of the indignation of the Cuban emigrants, launch an offensive operation and throw Fidel out. The US quickly found 1,400 disgruntled people who were ready to take part in the battle. The CIA was confident that the people would support the rebels and the communist regime would be overthrown. But America did not take into account the fact that the people who received the land supported Castro.

On April 15, 1961, emigrants began to carry out air strikes in unmarked planes. Airfields were bombed. The goal is to destroy aviation. However, this mission failed due to the inexperience of the rebels.

The next day, the Cubans were waiting for an attack from America. The leader of the country tried to protect people as much as possible. However, the attack took place only on 17 April.

instant war

The goal of the thousands of Cubans who landed on the island is to free their compatriots from communism. To start the operation, a not very good place was chosen - a bay in the province of Matanzas, the Bay of Pigs. This area is limited by swamps, which were extremely difficult to move around. Wasting no time, the rebels asked for help in the United States. An additional force arrived at a certain place within a few hours and immediately captured several points.

Castro decided that the only way to win this battle was to start an instant war. Consequently, all the forces of the revolutionaries were immediately directed to this zone. Despite the fact that the United States outnumbered the Cubans in military ammunition, Fidel's young and inexperienced soldiers managed to shoot down several enemy planes and sink two ships with help on board. Already on April 18, the revolutionaries won back part of the occupied territories.

Unsuccessful ending

The next day, the situation for the rebels worsened even more. The Bay of Pigs has become a kind of cage. On the one hand, this territory was washed by the sea, and on the other hand, it was surrounded by impenetrable swamps. In this regard, part of the rebel army surrendered. The other - fled back to the United States on ships. In total, more than 200 people died in this battle. Over 1,000 American soldiers were captured. Very soon Cuban leaders accused Kenedy and the CIA of trying to take over the island. Subsequently, the United States ransomed its military for colossal sums.

The whole world draws conclusions from this battle. The operation was poorly planned and staged. If earlier Castro intended to cooperate with America, then after this event he categorically refused to deal with it. Moreover, he became close to the Soviet Union and allowed to place on his territory nuclear weapon. All this led to

Entertainment for every taste

The Bay of Pigs has something to seduce the sophisticated foreign tourist today. On the right side of the bay there are unique coral reefs. Also here are the marshes of Zapata. This is a valuable find for tourists who are interested in nature. The territory is protected by law. Hundreds of animals live freely here, which can only be found on this island. For example, here people see pink flamingos, and avocets woodpeckers.

Next to this reserve is another tourist point. This village of Guama is a model of an Indian settlement. Small huts are built on tiny islands connected by beautiful bridges. In general, this is a picturesque and sincere place.

On the east coast are the Mangroves. The ecosystem of this zone amazes scientists, but for an ordinary tourist it can be boring and even dangerous here. Today, many foreigners are attracted to the Bay of Pigs because of the opportunity to engage in recreational diving here.

Edge of eternal summer

In addition to the fact that Cuba is the Island of Freedom, it is also an endless summer. Even in January, the temperature here does not fall below 25-27 °C. The air is warmest in August. Then the marks reach 30-32 ° C. The rainy season lasts from May to November. Most precipitation is recorded in June and October.

Cuba has a lot to offer vacationers. But the main thing that tourists come here for is that the Bay of Pigs made the province of Matanzas popular. There are two beaches on the coast - Playa Giron and Playa Larga.

AT recent times more and more tourists are interested in diving. Real underwater excursions are carried out in this bay. In addition, vacationers can visit flooded caves.

The Bay of Cochinos is a unique natural reserve whose landscapes fascinate and inspire.

On April 17, 1961, a naval assault force landed on the coast of Cuba in the Bay of Pigs (Cochinos), consisting of several hundred local counter-revolutionaries who planned to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro by military means.

The operation was completely planned by the CIA, arming and providing the paratroopers with everything necessary. However, for Langley, it ended in a complete failure, almost turning the flared up international scandal into a new full-scale world war.

Disgusting men tell how Cuba was able to fight off the American attack with the help of cunning scouts, wooden planes and T-34 tanks.

Viva la Revolution!

Cuba met the New Year of 1959 the way it later did - revolutionary. On January 1, the armed detachments of Fidel Castro and Ernesto Che Guevara were able to capture Havana and overthrow the military dictator Fulgencio Batista, after which representatives of the renewed state announced that they were now heading for the construction of socialism and close cooperation with the USSR.

The expropriation in favor of the people of the property acquired under Batista, both from those close to the dictator and from the wealthy sections of society, began. Prosperous generals, bourgeois and intellectuals were forced to flee to the United States, fearing reprisals from the workers and peasants, intoxicated by the spirit of the revolution.

Fidel Castro

The American authorities took the new socialist Cuba with hostility. In fact, under their noses, not only a state was formed from the opposing camp in the Cold War, but also the main foothold in the Caribbean for the main enemy - the Soviet Union.

A couple of months after the revolution in Cuba, an emergency commission was meeting in the administration of President Eisenhower, which was supposed to determine the further vector of work on the "red" neighbors.

Kennedy and Eisenhower

Under the leadership of the head of the CIA, Allen Dulles, a plan is being created for the rapid defeat of the revolutionary government of Castro. The task was clear - it was necessary to finish off the socialists before they could stand on their own feet.

The emphasis was on two main points. To begin with, from refugees from Cuba, it is necessary to create detachments of counter-revolutionaries from the most implacable opponents of the new government so that at the right time they can return to their homeland as saboteurs and intelligence officers, armed and trained.

At that time, the vast majority of refugees did not need extra motivation - in just a couple of weeks, the new Cuban government deprived them of their high positions and property. There were many military men among those who fled to America, including high-ranking ones, so the issue of preparation was practically resolved - the CIA only had to issue weapons and coordinate the actions of the detachments on the spot.

The second point is that radio towers should be placed on the coast, which will tell the Cubans about the horrors of the reign of the new dictator and his henchmen.

President Eisenhower personally authorized about $13 million for the operation, but the process was led by Langley. The State Department and senior CIA officials agreed that everything would be conducted in the strictest secrecy. The military was involved in this case only so that the Pentagon provided strongholds for future saboteurs and American support forces.

The task was set before the highest-ranking representatives of the law enforcement agencies and the administration - the world community should not have sniffed out that the CIA was preparing an operation to overthrow Castro. Of course, everyone will understand anyway that the Americans could not do without it, but the United States had to act exclusively in the role of a “peacemaker” acting on the side of the Cuban government in exile.

Here the first puncture was made. The CIA believed that Cuba would not soon recover from the revolution, and this was true, but only in part. According to some sources, agents working for Castro wormed their way among the refugees. She reported to Havana that the United States had launched a full-scale sabotage operation, for which the revolutionary government began to carefully prepare.

Landing at the Bay of Pigs

While the CIA was thinking about how best to overthrow Castro, John F. Kennedy came to power in America itself, blaming Eisenhower for allowing the Reds to settle a hundred miles from the US borders.

The new president with such a position could not but approve the operation, but the new administration treated it somewhat lightly, allowing intelligence to do everything without modifications in accordance with the already formed plan.

In March 1961, the future government of the country was formed from emigrants, consisting of José Miro Cardona, Manuel A. Verona and Manuel Rey. Everyone was waiting for a go-ahead.

The amphibious assault was decided to be carried out in April in the Bay of Pigs, on the southern coast of Cuba. Previously, it was necessary to destroy military airfields from which the Cubans could lift 24 aircraft into the air.

On April 15, 8 unmarked B-26 bombers moved towards the targets. In the future, the CIA planned to expose these pilots as patriots who were tired of putting up with the intrigues of Castro and went on the warpath, while other freedom fighters successfully supported them from the sea.

However, Cuban intelligence found out about the raid a little earlier and replaced the aircraft at the bases with wooden models. As a result, the planes bombed the “doll”, and anti-aircraft installations on the ground were able to shoot down one and seriously damage another bomber.

Another pilot, who landed in Miami, demanded political asylum from the United States and said that he was a Cuban Air Force officer who had become disillusioned with Castro's ideas. Corrosive journalists, however, caught him on inaccuracies several times, so the press conference had to be hastily curtailed. John Kennedy, learning about the failure, ordered no more bombing of airfields, but immediately proceed to the assault. As it turned out, the Cubans were also ready for it.

In the dead of night on April 17, three groups of paratroopers landed on the beaches of the Bay of Pigs, which covered seven ships equipped with machine guns and anti-aircraft guns from the sea. Four infantry battalions and one tank, as well as an artillery battalion were supposed to break through the flimsy defenses of the Cubans, but in reality it turned out differently.

At first, only a small group of coastal guards met the landing, but they were able to create the appearance of a battle, while a “lightning” flew to the general headquarters - the assault began.

Fidel Castro announced on the radio to the population about the attack of the imperialists and about the mass mobilization. The main forces of the Cuban army were located 120 kilometers from the battlefield, but the forces of the people's militia moved to meet the guests, who knew about the upcoming provocation and were well prepared.

As a result, a quick landing at the “gusanos” (worms, as the Cubans contemptuously called counter-revolutionaries and representatives of the “fifth column”) did not work out. At dawn, the whole and unharmed Cuban aircraft joined the fun, destroying several ships with ammunition and fuel.

However, the CIA's plan did not end there. In the San Blas area, a group of paratroopers from the “2506 brigade” (177 people) was landed, however, the locals had long known about them, so in fact they landed in an environment.

By morning, the advantage of the "Reds" became overwhelming - tank formations pulled ashore, howitzers were deployed, finally driving the enemy away from the coast. In this assault, only one T-34 tank of the defending side was hit.

The CIA did not give up and launched aircraft. The Cuban pilots refused to look for trouble, so the Americans sat at the controls, but an error in the interaction of the links led to the "red" Air Force intercepting and destroying two aircraft.

Effects

As a result, the attackers lost 114 people killed and 1202 wounded, and this is only among the paratroopers. The exact number of casualties among the amphibious assault is still not known.

The Cubans were able to capture 5 tanks and shoot down 12 aircraft (including those covering the airborne assault), while the Cuban Air Force did not lose a single one. How many people were killed is not known, but the damage to the defending side was estimated at $53 million, which was eventually paid by the US government under the guise of a tranche from some kind of charitable foundation.

The scandal was incredible - 40 countries condemned the US aggression against an independent state, but at that time there was no evidence of the direct participation of the Americans. It was not until 1986 that a US commission recognized the operation in the Bay of Pigs as an act of aggression and interference in Cuba's internal affairs.

However, this did not stop the CIA in any way - several dozen more attempts were made on the life of Fidel Castro, until the moment he left the post of head of Cuba in 2006.

Bay of Pigs Operation Museum

The attempt to overthrow the revolutionary government of Castro in April 1961 was only a warm-up for the Langley bosses before their next operations in the Middle East and Asia. Nevertheless, the Bay of Pigs fiasco is a great example of how a small group of people with a burning heart can defend independence even under the onslaught of such a giant as the United States. Not without the help of Soviet tanks, of course.

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    Operation in the Bay of Pigs

Subtitles

Before going into the details of the Bay of Pigs operation, it is necessary to describe the situation in Cuba and the United States at the time and the reasons for the invasion. So, in the late 50s, Cuba was ruled by this man named Batista. This was a dictator supported by the United States. To make it clear what kind of person he was, I will quote from the speech of John F. Kennedy, which took place in 1963, that is, after the Bay of Pigs incident and the Caribbean crisis had already occurred. Kennedy was not a big fan of Fidel Castro. But what he said "in hindsight", and this was said by him, John F. Kennedy, is a fairly objective assessment of Batista as a Cuban dictator. So this is what Kennedy said: “I am sure that there is no country in the world, including every single country under colonial yoke, where economic colonization, humiliation and exploitation were worse than in Cuba, and partly this was due to the policy of my country during the Batista regime... To a certain extent, Batista was like the incarnation of sins on the part of the United States. Now we have to pay for these sins." Therefore, even Kennedy said after the fact that Batista was far from the best person, and it was not the best idea on the part of the United States to support such a corrupt Cuban dictator for so many years. You can see Batista in the photo. Here he is with the American generals at the parade during one of his visits to Washington. Therefore, it is clear that in Cuba, as a ruler, he was not very loved, and in 1959 there was a revolution, as a result of which he was overthrown. 1959 - revolution. It was led by this man - Fidel Castro. His "right hands" were Raul Castro and Che Guevara - here they are in the photo. So, they seized power in Cuba. They were participants in this revolutionary nationalist movement. And that's what they did. They were left-wing politicians from the very beginning, and people thought that these rulers were perhaps communists or almost communists. From the very beginning, as soon as they came to power, they began to confiscate land that was privately owned. Part of it was Cuban private property, part - American. Their argument was that these riches, this private property, were ill-gotten, and they were acquired during Batista. These people carried out large-scale confiscation of large areas of land and private property, and the people began to think: "This is not only a nationalist revolution, this is also a communist revolution." And we must understand that after Castro seized power, a large-scale emigration of Cubans to the United States began, and it was primarily the representatives of the middle class, the bourgeoisie, educated Cubans who emigrated who were really afraid of the confiscation of private property and land plots. As a result, a community of fugitive Cubans began to form. They settled in Florida, mostly in Miami, and they still live there. They really did not like Fidel Castro (here he is in the photo). And now we'll fast-forward to 1961. John F. Kennedy became president. He was elected at the beginning of 1961, in April. John F. Kennedy has only been in office for a couple of months. But you can imagine how many Cuban emigrants there were, and how different they were - representatives of the bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, the middle class, and they all hated Fidel Castro. He confiscated their lands, which were now abandoned. And all this was taking place against the backdrop of the Cold War, and the United States was wary of countries leaning toward communism. It looked like Fidel Castro was a communist, so the US decided that since there were so many Cuban exiles who wanted to overthrow Castro, and the US itself only wanted to overthrow him because he was a communist, and they were afraid that he would want to stand up on the side of the Soviet Union. And in connection with this and with such a large number of Cuban emigrants, the CIA (here on the right in the photo is the director of the CIA during the Kennedy administration, or at least at the beginning of this administration, Allen Dulles, his brother is John Foster Dulles, whose name named airport in Washington and which was the Secretary of State of the United States). So, the CIA decided to overthrow Fidel Castro, but to do it in such a way that no one knew that America was carrying out the invasion. The states were planning an invasion with the help of Cuban emigrants. They found 1,400 Cuban exiles who agreed to join a CIA-backed US government-backed group, landing in Cuba and overthrowing Fidel Castro's regime. This whole plan was based on assumptions (you can imagine - this happened during the war in Iraq), when the CIA, the American president surrounded themselves with people who offered them very optimistic, hopeful scenarios that said: “We understand very well what wants the Cuban people." They said that if we just start a revolution, Fidel Castro will be overthrown. But the reality, at least at the time, was different. In the early 60s, Fidel Castro was very popular among the Cubans, especially among the poor who did not own land, and suddenly they got such a leader, I don’t know how popular he is now, but then he was definitely much more popular than the fugitive Cubans. And the CIA convinced Kennedy otherwise, so they got permission to plan the operation. Kennedy said: "If we can get rid of Castro, we reduce the risk of a communist state appearing off the coast of Florida." So they were planning a landing, but you understand they did it in total secrecy because they didn't want it to look like an American invasion, they wanted it to look like a pure Cuban counter-revolution. And to a certain extent, everything was mixed up there and looked really suspicious, because they were doing something that was not entirely clear. But by April 15 everything was ready for the operation. Here you need to talk about its details. 1400 emigrants were supposed to participate in it. They had several ships and planes that had their markings removed so they didn't look American. Or they were given false identification marks of the Cuban air force. So they could well be confused. And so, on April 15, 1961, we remember that it was only a few months after the Kennedy administration took office, they began to launch air strikes. The planes took off from airfields in Nicaragua. The purpose of the air strikes was to weaken the Cuban Air Force before the landing of 1,400 fugitive Cubans. They had eight planes, eight bombers. Taking off from Nicaragua, they bombed airfields located in Havana and not far from the current base in Guantanamo Bay. The purpose of the bombing was to destroy the Cuban air force. And it turned out that they did not succeed. By marking the American bombers with Cuban air force markings, they wanted to create confusion. So, 8 planes took off and bombed, one of them was shot down. The ninth plane took off from Nicaragua, and it was pre-pierced with bullet holes to make it look like it was being fired from anti-aircraft guns, and the plane flew to Florida. I think the idea here was to make it look like a Cuban pilot took off in Cuba or somehow escaped Cuba in a Cuban plane with these markings, tried to destroy a lot of Cuban planes and then escaped to the United States. That is the impression they wanted to create, and it is not clear whether the Cubans were "led" to him. When it happened in 1961, almost everyone understood that the attack was organized by the Americans. We now move to the night of April 16th (let's write "April 16th") when everyone was expecting an American attack. And this is one of the reasons that led to the fact that the attack turned out to be a series of poorly organized operations. It turned out that some of these emigrants talked too much about the upcoming operation, and Soviet intelligence found out about it, so the Cubans knew about the upcoming operation. So, on April 16th, a fake attack began at Baia Honda located here, it used mock ships with loudspeakers that broadcast the sounds of firing to confuse the Cubans, and Castro mistakenly thought for a while that the operation began there, because the Cubans were in a state of on high alert, expecting an imminent attack, but this was a false attack. So, this happened on the evening of April 16th. And the real attack began on the morning of April 17th. 1,400 Cuban émigrés, supported by the CIA and the American army (all of which was kept secret) launched an attack in the Bay of Pigs. In short, it was not the most successful operation. It was derailed as a result of poor planning and incompetence at some stages. If the operation continued from April 17 (it was its first day), then by the 19th, the invasion force (they are also counter-revolutionaries), consisting of 1400 Cuban emigrants, were driven back to the beaches, more than 100 of them were killed and more than 1000 - captured. Over 1,000 were taken prisoner. And in the same year, Fidel Castro... Some were executed immediately after being taken prisoner. So, in the same year, Fidel Castro made a deal with the United States, under the terms of which he handed over the prisoners to the United States in exchange for assistance and supplies in the amount of 58 million dollars. And from a military point of view, as well as from the point of view of the United States, it was a complete defeat. And you understand that after everything that happened, the people of the United States began to look for someone to blame. The CIA and the Cuban émigrés blamed the Kennedy administration, they said, "Look, he didn't want to do what was needed to make the operation successful, he didn't want to provide quality air support when the operation started, he didn't want to use more US troops when the operation started. , and the situation was not in favor of emigrants. Kennedy, for his part, blamed the CIA. He said: "Look, everything was done and planned incompetently." He said that "you gave me wrong information, you told me that when the operation starts, the people will revolt against Fidel Castro, and this did not happen." Here is a quote from John F. Kennedy's statement after the Bay of Pigs operation. "The first piece of advice I want to give to my successor is to control the generals, because they are military men, and because of that, their opinions on military matters are damnable." This is what John F. Kennedy said after the Bay of Pigs operation. You can "dig" deeper and find out exactly how he said and what he did. But the most important thing here is that the failure had very negative consequences for the United States. After that, the power of Fidel Castro in Cuba ... America simply could not do anything better. It was a huge embarrassment for them, for the United States, which allowed Fidel Castro to concentrate all power in his hands and led to the fact that he openly took communist positions, and also ... Although before the operation in the Bay of Pigs he made some attempts to improve relations with the United States. But America didn't like him because he confiscated private property and was clearly leftist. After the operation in the Bay of Pigs, he definitely began to move closer to the Soviet Union. He began to talk openly about Cuba being a Marxist-Leninist, communist state, and because he feared a new American invasion, he allowed Soviet Union place in Cuba, next to the territory of the United States, ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, which led to the "Caribbean crisis". That is, all these events have caused exceptional harm to the United States. Subtitles by the Amara.org community

background

Evolution of the nature of the operation

(a) the creation of a unified Cuban opposition; (b) the deployment of a radio station for "gray" broadcasting to Cuba on short and long waves; (c) the continued establishment of an intelligence and subversive network in Cuba; (d) continued preparations for the establishment of a paramilitary force outside of Cuba.

In fact, at this stage, a combination of guerrilla action and psychological warfare was proposed. The CIA immediately set about training 300 guerrillas, first in the United States and the Panama Canal zone, and then in Guatemala. The radio station on Bolshoy Sisne Island began operating on May 17 using equipment left on the island after being used for radio propaganda as part of Operation PBSUCCESS. In June, the CIA managed to form the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front (KDRF) from the fragmented Cuban opposition (184 groups according to the CIA's own calculations).

In the fall of 1960, the CIA realized that guerrilla warfare might not reach the critical mass needed for an uprising against Castro, and the nature of the operation began to change from guerrilla warfare to amphibious landings. In September, a military adviser appeared in the WH / 4 group involved in the preparation of the operation - Colonel of the Marine Corps J. Hawkins (English) Russian. In the CIA correspondence on October 31, 1960, it was indicated that, according to a plan not yet approved, the sabotage group would be no more than 60 people, and at least 1,500 people in several battalions, and possibly US special forces, would participate in the landing operation.

After the failure of landing and resupply operations for guerrilla groups in October 1960, at a meeting at the White House on November 29, the CIA proposed a new plan for approval by the president, who was clearly irritated by Castro's persistence in Cuba. Nobody in the audience objected to the new approach; Eisenhower still demanded that "America's hand not be seen." The decision to use amphibious landings, like many others, was not written down on paper; as in other cases, the president did not get involved in the details of covert operations, which was necessary to preserve his ability to plausible deniability.

On January 4, 1961, the CIA presented a new plan, according to historian P. Gleichesis (English) Russian, "the most realistic" and much more thoughtful than the later Trinidad and Zapata plans. The plan included the following sequence of actions:

  • landing of 750 people captures a small bridgehead in Cuba. The purpose of the landing will be to survive and hold a bridgehead in conditions of complete air superiority. The document explicitly stated that the operation should not be carried out unless tactical air support was available and proposed the use of airfields in Florida, making the illusion of American non-intervention impossible;
  • The CIA expected a general uprising against Castro to begin within a few weeks of the landings and be successful within a few more weeks. Until such an uprising begins, the landing force should not attempt to expand the bridgehead;
  • if the uprising does not start, then a provisional government will be landed on the bridgehead, which will be recognized by the United States and possibly other Latin American countries and will ask for help. This assistance will be provided in the form of direct US military intervention.

Under Eisenhower, the US military was used solely for support and was not used in planning; although representatives of the Committee Chiefs of Staff were present at all key meetings and did not object, they were never asked to evaluate the plans of the CIA or the quality of the training of the paratroopers. Kennedy immediately involved the military in discussing plans, revealing significant differences in positions at a meeting on January 28, 1961. Plans reported to the President changed at this point: Richard M.Bissell (English) Russian, who was responsible for planning the operation, in a memo dated February 8, Kennedy spoke of the optimism of the CIA and the Department of Defense about the invasion: "in the worst case, the landing force will be able to break into the mountains, and in the best, develop a large-scale civil war in which we can openly support the opponents of Castro ". At the same time, diplomat T. Mann (English) Russian believed that there were no chances for a quick uprising against Castro, and the United States would essentially have to choose between the loss of the landing force, the difficulties of supplying guerrillas in the mountains, and direct intervention.

The "Trinidad" plan, recommended by the CIA on March 11, 1961, included capturing and holding a foothold near the city of Trinidad, repulsing Cuban militia attacks, and setting the stage for a large-scale uprising. If unsuccessful, the paratroopers were to withdraw to the nearby mountains and move on to guerrilla warfare. The plan was silent about how the paratroopers - after the defeat on the bridgehead - would make their way to the mountains through the environment, but noted that "the provisional government should be landed immediately after the capture of the bridgehead." In the event of a successful operation, the government was supposed to recognize and thereby create conditions for at least non-state material support. Kennedy rejected the plan, demanding that it be replaced with a less ambitious one that could more plausibly look like a purely Cuban operation.

  • a smaller version of the Trinidad, with a night landing without airborne assault and air support;
  • landing on the northeast coast of Cuba;
  • landing in the Bay of Pigs, which by March 16 had become the Zapata plan.

US domestic political considerations

Shortly after Eisenhower's approval of the amphibious assault plan, there was a change of administration in the United States, with Kennedy as president. By the time the new president came in, the practical details had not been clarified, and after the disaster, Eisenhower justified himself by saying that he was only training a small number of Cubans, "despite a lot of talk, there were no plans yet with a specific number, landing site or support" .

Kennedy was informed about the preparation of the operation during the election campaign. After his victory in the elections, in October 1960, Dulles and Bissell informed the future president about the details of the operation, Kennedy did not object, and preparations continued. However, key members of the future administration were not briefed, and Kennedy did not request further information. As a result, according to T. Mann, who unsuccessfully tried to arrange the transfer of cases between administrations, it turned out “stupidity - as if it [the operation] will disappear if it is not dealt with. Kennedy tried to ignore it when he still had many months to think."

The above-mentioned CIA plan of January 4, 1961 explicitly mentioned the need to obtain the consent of the new president for air support for the landing.

Kennedy's hands were tied by his campaign stance in confrontation with Castro. During the campaign, he attacked Eisenhower for admitting the possibility of a communist threat "90 miles from the United States." This position attracted voters to him, but, after coming to power, made the cancellation of the operation almost impossible; in the words of Robert Kennedy, “everyone would say that he chickened out ... it was Eisenhower's plan; Eisenhower's people were confident of success."

Kennedy himself preferred a strategy of gradually building up guerrilla warfare and repeatedly expressed this, but the CIA assessed such actions while impossible, including because of the position of Cuban emigrants prepared for the landing, who believed that an open attack had better chances for a direct military attack. US support. Unconvinced by the CIA's assessments, Kennedy hesitated, but the preparations for the operation proceeded on their own, and the delay brought the president closer to approving the landing.

Kennedy continued to have doubts about the chosen plan of operation. So, on April 4, he again reported that he would prefer to see an invasion force of 200-250 people; The CIA again replied that this was impossible.

"Phase Two"

In February 1961, discussion of what would happen after the landing and capture of the beachhead (the so-called "Phase 2") was practically abandoned, despite disagreements between Bissell and Mann. Bissell later justified this by saying that planning for the subsequent stages in covert operations is usually incomplete, since the outcome of the first phase is usually difficult to predict: "we did not agree on what to do after the establishment of a beachhead."

Disagreements about phase 2 were not only between the CIA and the State Department, but also within the CIA. Bissell and those around him in the CIA believed that if the landing force could hold out for a few days, they could hold out for a month, and in the meantime, while Castro could not retake the beachhead, the rebel air forces controlled the sky, bombed without interruption and with increasing efficiency - something will happen. However, at the same time, Hawkins believed that the brigade would attract young people, strengthen and go to Havana, and Bissell himself thought that options with the recognition of the interim government and direct support from either the United States or the OAS were more likely. Mann's disbelief in the possibility of any success in phase 2 did not go beyond the memorandum: being essentially alone, at the decisive moment he did not object to the landing - but was eager to stop his participation in the planning of the operation and left Washington before the landing; at the time of the disaster, Mann was ambassador to Mexico.

In fact, there was a fundamental difference between the views of the President and the CIA in assessing what would happen if the landing did not develop according to an optimistic scenario: Dulles and Bissell believed that, given a choice between failure of the operation and direct US military intervention, the President would choose open invasion of Cuba. Kennedy repeatedly made it clear during the planning process that he would not issue such an order, but Bissell in particular assumed that, faced with the possibility of failure, Kennedy would change his mind. According to P. Gleichesis, Kennedy and the CIA at that moment resembled ships that diverged at night in different courses, but did not understand this. To get the plan approved by the president, the CIA kept describing the possibility of the amphibious going over to guerrilla warfare and thus the impossibility of a total failure, when in fact it didn't even plan for that option (singing a "lullaby" for the president, according to Gleichesis).

Preparing for an invasion

The preparations took place in complete secrecy, in the words of Eisenhower himself, "everyone had to be ready to swear that he had not heard anything about it." The planning of the operation was carried out similarly to PBSUCCESS, a special unit within the Directorate of Plans. (English) Russian, practically without the participation of the Directorate of Intelligence.

General management of the operation (received the code name Operation Pluto) was carried out by CIA Director Allen Dulles. Responsible for the development and implementation of the operation was General Richard M. Bissell, who served as Deputy Director of Planning for the CIA. (English) Russian). In doing so, Dulles gave Bissell wide discretion in operational matters. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Whiting Willauer coordinated the State Department's preparations for the invasion. The head of the project (WH / 4 group) within the CIA was J. Esterline (English) Russian.

At the same time, significant efforts were made to consolidate the political opponents of Castro (who had already created about 60 associations and groups). As a result, the "Democratic Revolutionary Front" ("Democratic Revolutionary Front") was created. Frente”), which included five groups, Manuel A. Verona became its leader.

In November 1960, under the pretext of "protecting Nicaragua and Guatemala from a possible attack from Cuba," the United States sent a group of US Navy warships to the coast of Cuba, which was the next stage of preparation for the landing operation in the Bay of Pigs.

The preparations for the operation did not go unnoticed. Separate references to the military training of Cuban emigrants appeared in the open press. On December 31, 1960, at a meeting of the UN General Assembly and on January 4, 1961, at a meeting of the UN Security Council, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Castro Roa made a statement about the preparation by American intelligence services of an armed invasion of Cuba.

After taking office as President J. F. Kennedy, on January 20, 1961, A. Dulles and R. Bissell acquainted him with the plan of the landing operation (“ Operation Trinidad”), and the president expressed the wish that the plan be further studied by Pentagon experts. On January 26, a meeting was held, as a result of which a slightly modified version of the operation plan was approved, which provided for an increase in the number of paratroopers from 800-1000 to 1443 people, providing them with bulldozers and tools for preparing a field airfield, as well as additional weapons.

On April 8, 1961, a radio message was broadcast to the Cuban people and governments of Latin American countries calling for an armed struggle against Castro.

As a result of Cuban anti-aircraft fire, two B-26s were damaged - one of them fell into the sea 50 km north of Cuba (the crew of two people died), the second damaged aircraft landed at the Key West airbase, but later in did not take part in the operation.

A third B-26 landed at Miami International Airport. The pilot of this plane made a statement that he and his associates were deserters from the Cuban Air Force, after which he turned to the US authorities with a request for political asylum. However, the disinformation mechanism did not work, as the invited journalists noticed the differences between the landed version of the B-26 and those that were in service with the Cuban Air Force, and drew attention to the fact that, contrary to the story of the pilots, the bomber's machine guns were not used (the barrels were clean). The incident caused significant international outcry.

A second raid on Cuba was canceled by order of President J.F. Kennedy.

The fleet of the "Cuban Expeditionary Force" consisted of two landing ships (LCI " Blagar" and LCI " Barbara J"") and five cargo ships - "Houston" (code designation " Aguja”), “Rio Escondido” (code designation “ Ballena”), “Caribe” (code designation “ Sardinia”), “Atlantico” (code designation “ Tiburon) and Lake Charles. Radars and anti-aircraft machine guns were installed on landing ships, and anti-aircraft guns were installed on transport ships.

Amphibious operation and battle of Playa Giron

At about 07:30, six military transport aircraft (five C-46s and one C-54), in accordance with the Sokol plan, dropped the 1st airborne battalion of the “2506 brigade” (177 people) in the San Blas area .

By 11 o'clock, the two remaining transports of the "brigade 2506" withdrew to the open sea.

On the evening of April 17, more than 2,000 122-mm shells were fired at the landing, but shelling of a long and narrow front turned out to be ineffective, since the paratroopers had already dug in.

The bombers were supposed to escort US jet fighters from the aircraft carrier Wessex, but the aircraft missed each other, and two B-26s with crews of US citizens (pilots of the Alabama National Guard) were shot down by the Cuban Air Force.

At the same time, the Nicaraguan dictator Somoza proposed using six P-51  Mustang fighters of the Nicaraguan Air Force (on which identification marks began to be painted over) for air support, but this decision was rejected.

On the same day, Cuban T-34-85 tanks destroyed two tanks of the Brigade 2506.

In the afternoon, two American destroyers, USS Eaton (code Santiago) and USS Murray (code designation Tampico) approached the coast of the Bay of Pigs in order to evacuate the personnel of the invasion forces, however, after several shots in their direction from tank guns, the ships left for the open sea.

The Cuban Air Force and Air Defense shot down 12 B-26 "Invader", C-46 and other types of aircraft that covered the landing, including several with crews from the United States. Of these, 7 B-26s and 1 C-46 were shot down by Cuban fighters, who suffered no losses.

The Cuban government estimated the damage caused to the country by the invasion at $53 million. In April 1962, the Husanos prisoners from Brigade 2506 were tried and handed over to the United States in December 1962 in exchange for a $53 million shipment of medicines and food, which were provided by the US government, but made on behalf of charitable foundation "Tractors for Freedom Committee" .

Subsequent events

The failure of the operation caused a significant resonance in the US and internationally. In Cairo, Jakarta, Rio de Janeiro, and Lima, protesters made attempts to storm US diplomatic missions.

At the UN meeting, representatives of 40 countries condemned the US aggression against Cuba.

The government of the USSR condemned the armed invasion and sent a note of protest to the United States calling for measures to stop the aggression against Cuba.

In 1986, representatives of the US scientific community (American historians G. Zinn, V. E. Williams, G. Kolko, L. Gardner, D. Horowitz, etc.) admitted that the US operation in 1961 was US interference in the internal affairs of Cuba , an act of US aggression against Cuba and a direct violation of Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, under which the United States put its signature in 1948, prohibiting anyone from interfering in the internal affairs of any country. The text of the expert opinion was published in full in The Nation.

Review by General Maxwell Taylor

On April 22, 1961, President Kennedy demanded that General Maxwell Taylor, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and CIA Director Allen Dulles form a Cuba Study Group to investigate the failure of the operation. On July 13, General Taylor sent the report of the commission of inquiry to President Kennedy. The reasons for the defeat, according to the compilers of the report, were related to the lack of early deployment, the inability to succeed by covert means, and insufficient air support (insufficient number of pilots involved and air strikes), an insufficient amount of weapons and ammunition provided to the “2506 brigade”, flooding of the ships of the brigade .

Declassified US government documents show that after the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation, the US continued to consider and prepare a direct military invasion of Cuba.

According to the report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States (Operation Northwoods) on March 13, 1962, a number of provocations were supposed to be used as a reason for direct military intervention in Cuba, in particular:

  • 1. Sabotage in and around the American military base in Guantanamo (as examples were considered: arson of an aircraft and flooding of a ship; it was necessary to publish a list of non-existent "dead" in the media).
  • 2. The sinking of the ship with Cuban refugees.
  • 3. Organize terrorist attacks in Miami, other cities in Florida and Washington, directed at Cuban refugees. Arrest "Cuban agents" and publish fake "documents".
  • 4. Carry out an air raid on the territory of states adjacent to Cuba.
  • 5. Simulate attacks on passenger planes and shoot down an unmanned American plane or blow up a radio-controlled ship. To simulate attacks, use the F-86 Saber fighter repainted under the "Cuban MIG". It was also planned to publish in the newspapers a list of those killed in a downed plane or a blown up ship.
  • 6. Simulate the downing of a US military aircraft by a Cuban MiG.

Each incident was supposed to be blamed on the Cuban government.

"Gusanos"

Additional Information

Memory

Later, a museum of the operation was opened in Playa Giron, at the entrance to which one of the Cuban Air Force aircraft ("C Fury"), which participated in the operation, was installed. Along the entire road along which Cuban troops marched to Playa Giron, commemorative obelisks were erected in places where soldiers died during the bombing. The victory is celebrated annually on April 19, in its commemoration, Air Force and Air Defense Day is set on April 17, and April 18 is Tankman Day. In July 1961, the Council of Ministers of the country established the Order of Playa Giron, one of the highest state awards in Cuba.

In 1959, revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro overthrew the Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. After the socialists came to power, the "Island of Freedom" abruptly changed its foreign policy and left the sphere of influence of the United States. America failed to quickly solve the "Cuban problem" with economic sanctions and political pressure, and the task of overthrowing the Castro regime was assigned to law enforcement agencies. What could the newly formed self-defense forces of the young Cuban Republic have to counter the American invasion? However, the landing of mercenaries on the Cuban beaches of Playa Giron failed in two days. Forty years later, details of planning and conducting the landing on Playa Giron became known from declassified US archives.

Considering that under the dictator Batista, American capital controlled about seventy percent of the Cuban economy, one can understand that businessmen from the mainland could not simply abandon the super-profitable business. Castro would later say: "They [the United States] cannot forgive us for being under their noses and that we made a socialist revolution under the noses of the United States." Thus, the return of control over Cuba was motivated for the United States by both political and economic interests. US President Dwight Eisenhower assigned this task to the CIA and the Pentagon.

By order of March 17, 1960, CIA director Allen Dulles was appointed responsible for the armed overthrow of the Cuban government, and his deputy planner, General Richard Bissell, took up the development of the invasion. From the Pentagon, a specialist in sabotage actions, Colonel Alcott, was involved. On the government side, the $13 million White House operation was overseen by Assistant Secretary of State Whiting Willauer.

The operation was called "Pluto", and at first its headquarters in Miami consisted of only a dozen specialists. With the coming to power of the new President John F. Kennedy, after a meeting with the participation of senior military officials and the political establishment, at which the time of the invasion was determined in the spring of 1961, Pluto moved into the operational planning phase.

It was decided to attack Cuba with the forces of emigrant mercenaries. It was assumed that the landing troops would capture part of the coastal territory and create a provisional government, which in turn would seek military assistance from the United States. In advance, the CIA began to throw small groups of saboteurs into Cuba with the task of preparing force actions inside the country for the landing day: blowing up communication lines, bridges and warehouses. For the political cover of the operation, the "Democratic Revolutionary Front" was created under the leadership of Manuel Verona; the leaders of the "front" were supposed to form a new government of Cuba.

After John Kennedy criticized the CIA for the insufficient scale of the upcoming action, camps were set up in Nicaragua, Guatemala and the southern United States to train mercenaries. The invasion group was named "Brigade 2506" and the number of fighters in it was doubled, to almost one and a half thousand people. They were given heavy equipment and bulldozers to organize fortified defenses and a temporary airfield. The fighters of the brigade were assigned a personal number, but the numbering began with 2000 to create the appearance of a large unit. In total, the invasion forces consisted of four infantry, one artillery, parachute and motorized battalions and a company of M41 light tanks. San Roman, a former captain in the army of the dictator Batista, was assigned to lead the brigade.

In the Nicaraguan port of Puerto Cabezas, the Pentagon has concentrated naval and air support groups. Two WWII US Navy landing craft (Blagar and Barbara Jane), several hastily armed vessels from a former private Cuban shipping company, and seven tank landing craft to unload equipment in the landing area. From the air, the operation was to be covered by 14 military transport aircraft (C-46 "Commando" and C-54 "Skymaster") and 24 B-26 tactical bombers transferred from the US Air Force.

Before the invasion, the Pentagon planned to launch several bombing strikes on Cuban airfields, but just before the landing, the American command was afraid that a series of large-scale air raids would cause other states to accuse the United States of aggression against Cuba. As a result, a compromise was made, and as it turned out, an erroneous decision: to limit ourselves to eight sorties.

Despite the regime of total secrecy with which the CIA surrounded Operation Pluto, even a few months before it began, speculation about the impending landing appeared in the world press. And in early 1961, at a meeting of the UN Security Council, the Cuban Foreign Minister directly accused the US authorities of preparing an invasion. To hide their participation in the armed aggression, the United States postponed the landing time to the night and changed the place - the choice fell on the deserted Bay of Pigs (literally translated as "Bay of Pigs"). The operation to overthrow the regime of Fidel Castro became known as "Zapata".



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