Colonel Gru Oleg Penkovsky was burned in the crematorium. How the traitor Oleg Penkovsky was actually executed

11.02.2022 | Nature

Oleg Penkovsky photography

1937-1939 - training at the 2nd Kiev Artillery School

1939-1940 - political instructor of the battery (participant in the Polish and Finnish wars)

1940-1941 - deputy head of the political department for Komsomol work of the Moscow Artillery School

1941-1942 - senior instructor for Komsomol work of the Political Directorate of the Moscow Military District

1942-1943 - Special Assignment Officer of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District

1943-1944 - head of the training detachment and later commander of the artillery battalion of the 27th artillery regiment of the 1st Ukrainian Front

1944-1945 - adjutant of the artillery commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front Penkovsky, Varentsov was demoted to major general and deprived of awards, although no charges were brought against him during the trial and investigation.The then head of the GRU Serov I.A. had similar problems.)

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1945 - Commander of the 51st Guards Artillery Regiment of the 1st Ukrainian Front

1945-1948 - training at the Military Academy. Frunze

1948 - senior officer of the mobilization department of the Moscow military district

1948-1949 - Officer of the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of the Ministry of Defense

1949-1953 - studying at the Military Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Defense

1953-1955 - senior officer of the 4th directorate of the GRU

1955-1956 - senior assistant to the military attache at the USSR Embassy in Turkey, acted as a resident of the GRU in this country.

1956-1958 - senior officer of the 5th directorate of the GRU

1958-1959 - studying at the higher engineering courses of the Military Academy. Dzerzhinsky

1959-1960 - senior officer of the 4th directorate of the GRU

1960 - senior officer of the special department of the 3rd Directorate of the GRU

1960-1962 - work "undercover" as deputy head of the Foreign Relations Department of the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

The operation to expose and detain Penkovsky was led by Colonel-General P. I. Ivashuti.

According to Yevgeny Ivanov, Penkovsky offered his services to British intelligence by making contact for the first time in November 1960 at the Canadian embassy in Moscow. Then he collaborated with MI5 and the CIA.

Family

Father-in-law - Major General Dmitry Afanasyevich Gapanovich (1896–1952), head of the Political Directorate of the Moscow Military District.

Uncle - Lieutenant General Valentin Antonovich Penkovsky (1904-1969), held a high position in the Ministry of Defense.

However, this is disputed by the chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 1961-1967. V. E. Semichastny writes literally the following in his memoirs: Penkovsky’s stories that his grandfather’s brother, Valentin Antonovich Penkovsky, was the chief of staff of a military district in the Far East, and then in Belarus, were not confirmed either. Such a person really existed and held the named posts. During the Great Patriotic War, he fought under the command of Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky. However, that Penkovsky had nothing in common with our “hero”, except for his last name. Oleg Penkovsky needed such fiction in order to strengthen his significance in the eyes of Western partners...

Awards

2 orders of the Red Banner,

Order of Alexander Nevsky,

order Patriotic War 1st degree

order of the Red Star,

8 medals

By court verdict, he was deprived of his military rank and all state awards.

Defector Viktor Suvorov dedicated one of his books to Penkovsky.

Oleg Penkovsky
Peter 28.12.2015 11:13:08

Personally, I would rehabilitate Penkovsky, because.
many Soviet citizens did not take the confrontation with NATO seriously after everything they had done to defend the USSR from the fascist army.
Penkovsky only returned to the United States part of the national debt in the form of his
Riot. Many Muscovites and guests of the capital would laugh at the accusations of espionage in favor of the USSR patron country in science and money. Yes, there are people who tried to escape to the west a week before the fall of the Berlin Wall, there are people who, through stones, hiding places transferred money from the west to relatives and there are eccentrics ..
enjoying a dose of risk
When a soldier is not fighting, he
gets fat, loses shape, especially the scout - there is no risk, barking,
chase, the squeak of brakes, the smell of burnt coal ... - here, probably Penkovsky, and for training, he came up with entertainment for himself - to pull
the police by the tail: what came of it is known ...

Stripped of all awards

Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky(April 23, Vladikavkaz - May 16) - Colonel (deprived of his rank in 1963) of the GRU of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. In 1963, he was accused of espionage (in favor of the United States and Great Britain) and treason, shot by the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. Many experts call Penkovsky the most effective agent of the West ever working against the USSR. Thus, a professor at Cambridge University Christopher Andrew, a well-known historian of British intelligence, points out Penkovsky as "the largest agent of British intelligence in the ranks of the Soviet special services", and the second after him - Oleg Gordievsky.

Biography

- graduated from secondary school No. 5 [ ] in Ordzhonikidze
- - training at the 2nd Kiev Artillery School, graduated.
- - political instructor of the battery (participant of the Polish campaign and the Winter War)
- - assistant to the head of the political department for Komsomol work of the Moscow Artillery School
- - senior instructor for Komsomol work of the Political Directorate of the Moscow Military District
- - Special Assignment Officer of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District
- - head of the training detachment and later commander of the artillery battalion of the 27th artillery regiment of the 1st Ukrainian Front
- - adjutant of the artillery commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Long-term official and personal relations, including in the post-war years, between Penkovsky and candidate member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chief Marshal of Artillery S.S. Varentsov led to the fact that after the trial of Penkovsky, Varentsov was reduced in rank to major general and deprived of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and all government awards, although no charges were brought against him during the trial and investigation.
- Commander of the 51st Guards Artillery Regiment of the 1st Ukrainian Front
- - studied at the Military Academy named after M. V. Frunze
- senior officer of the mobilization department of the headquarters of the Moscow military district
- - officer of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces
In - years he studied at the Military Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Army (VASA), after graduation he was assigned to the 4th (Middle East) Directorate of the GRU.
- - senior officer of the 4th directorate of the GRU. In the middle of 1955, he was preparing for his first foreign trip to Turkey as a military attaché and resident of the GRU.
- - Senior assistant to the military attache at the USSR Embassy in Turkey, acted as a GRU resident in this country. For his activities there, see.
- - senior officer of the 5th directorate of the GRU
-- training at the higher engineering courses of the Military Academy named after F. E. Dzerzhinsky . According to Cand. ist. Sciences Vilen Lyulechnik, the second admission of Colonel Penkovsky to serve in military intelligence was authorized by none other than the head of the GRU Ivan Alexandrovich Serov personally.
- - senior officer of the 4th directorate of the GRU
- senior officer of the special department of the 3rd (scientific and technical) directorate of the GRU
- - work "undercover" as deputy head of the Department of Foreign Relations of the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

All British diplomats and Englishmen living in Moscow were placed under surveillance. One of Penkovsky's contacts and brought to his trail

Ten days later, Penkovsky's liaison Greville Wynn was arrested in Budapest. On May 11, 1963, O. V. Penkovsky was found guilty of treason by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR and sentenced to death (executed on May 16). Greville Wynn was found guilty of espionage and sentenced to eight years in prison: three years in prison and five years in camps. In April 1964, Wynn was exchanged for the Soviet intelligence officer Konon the Young, who was serving a 20-year sentence in an English prison for espionage.

The operation to expose and detain Penkovsky was led by Colonel-General P. I. Ivashutin.

The story with Penkovsky was the reason for the removal of the head of the GRU, Ivan Serov

According to Yevgeny Ivanov, Penkovsky offered his services to British intelligence, making contact for the first time in November 1960 at the Canadian embassy in Moscow. He further collaborated with MI5 and the CIA. He also noted that "significant damage (inflicted by Penkovsky) became possible not least because of the special and by no means only official relations established between Penkovsky and Serov" . "Penkovsky collaborated for only a couple of years, although he transferred a huge amount of materials," noted Oleg Gordievsky.

Penkovsky returned from his first trip to London on May 6, 1961. He brought with him a miniature Minox camera and a transistor radio. He managed to transfer 111 Minox films to the West, on which 5500 documents were shot with a total volume of 7650 pages. During three business trips to London and Paris, he was interrogated for a total of 140 hours, reports on them took up 1200 pages of typewritten text. According to his tip, according to documents published in the West, 600 Soviet intelligence agents “burned out”, 50 of them were GRU officers.

Event evaluation

Information about Penkovsky, his work in the GRU and cooperation with the special services of the United States and Great Britain is still classified as secret, so most of the assessments are based on circumstantial facts, official information disseminated at the time by the USSR, Great Britain and the United States, and on those published in the United States in 1965 in the autobiographical notes of O. V. Penkovsky himself (authorship is often disputed).

Family

Penkovsky's stories that his grandfather's brother, Valentin Antonovich Penkovsky, was the chief of staff of a military district in the Far East, and then in Belarus, were not confirmed either. Such a person really existed and held the named posts. During the Great Patriotic War, he fought under the command of Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky. However, that Penkovsky had nothing in common with our “hero”, except for his last name. Oleg Penkovsky needed such fiction in order to strengthen his significance in the eyes of Western partners...

Awards

8 medals

By court verdict, he was deprived of his military rank and all government awards.

Burning alive version

It is widely believed that Vladimir Rezun (pseudonym Viktor Suvorov) described that Penkovsky was not shot, but burned alive in a crematorium oven. The whole procedure was filmed and later shown to future scouts for intimidation. Although in his book "Aquarium" the story of the burning alive of a defector does appear, it does not indicate that it was Penkovsky. The fact that this story describes the fate of Penkovsky was first said by Joseph Brodsky in an article published by The New Republic magazine, the head of the TsOS SVR of Russia, Major General Yuri Kobaladze, and also indirectly by Rezun himself and Oleg Gordievsky, referring to the same Brodsky and Ernst Neizvestny as a primary source, although Brodsky's article was published seven years later than the Aquarium novel and was clearly borrowed from it. The same story is reproduced (obviously borrowed from Rezun) by Tom Clancy in the novel The Red Rabbit. Subsequently, Rezun began to directly deny that the described story has anything to do with Penkovsky (without specifying, however, to whom it may be related, because Penkovsky is the only known executed GRU defector with the rank of colonel; another suitable candidate is GRU Lieutenant Colonel P. S. Popov).

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Literature

Trial in the criminal case of an agent of British and American intelligence, a citizen of the USSR Penkovsky O. V. and a spy-communicator of a British citizen Wynn G. - M., May 7–11, 1963. - M .: Politizdat, 1963. - 320 p. - 100,000 copies.

Degtyarev K. SMERSH. - M .: Yauza Eksmo, 2009. - S. 610-623. - 736 p. - (Encyclopedia of special services). - 4000 copies. - ISBN 978-5-699-36775-7.

Maksimov A.[B.] The main secret of the GRU. - M .: Yauza Eksmo, 2010. - 416 p. - (GRU). - 4000 copies. - ISBN 978-5-699-40703-3.
Lemekhov O.I. , Prokhorov D.P. Defectors. Shot in absentia. - (Special archive). - M.: Veche; ARIA-AiF, 2001. - 464 p. - ISBN 5-7838-0838-5 ("Veche"), ISBN5-93229-120-6 (CJSC "ARIA-AiF").
Shekter J., Deryabin P. The Spy Who Saved the World. Volume 1-2. - (Secret missions). - M.: International relations, 1993. - 296 p. + 296 p. - ISBN 5-7133-0594-5.
- M.: Tsentrpoligraf. - (Secret folder). - ISBN 5-227-00732-2

Notes

Sergei Chertoprud.. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (June 9, 2000). Retrieved January 10, 2013. .
Colonel Igor POPOV: “Then, for the betrayal of Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, General of the Army Alexander Serov was removed from the post of head of the GRU.”
Elena Avadyaeva, Leonid Zdanovich
Oleg Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy papers, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1965, (erroneous)
Semichastny, V. E. Chapter "The Penkovsky Case" // Restless Heart. - M .: Vagrius, 2003. - S. 230.
Teleconference with Viktor Suvorov, Moscow-London, broadcast on Russian TV, late 1997
. Retrieved April 10, 2013. .

An excerpt characterizing Penkovsky, Oleg Vladimirovich

- But why are you ashamed? Yes, I don’t know. Embarrassing, embarrassing.
“But I know why she will be ashamed,” said Petya, offended by Natasha’s first remark, “because she was in love with this fat man with glasses (as Petya called his namesake, the new Count Bezukhy); now she is in love with this singer (Petya spoke about the Italian, Natasha's singing teacher): so she is ashamed.
“Petya, you are stupid,” said Natasha.
“No stupider than you, mother,” said nine-year-old Petya, as if he were an old foreman.
The countess was prepared by Anna Mikhailovna's hints during dinner. Having gone to her room, she, sitting on an armchair, did not take her eyes off the miniature portrait of her son, fixed in a snuff box, and tears welled up in her eyes. Anna Mikhailovna, with the letter on tiptoe, went up to the countess's room and stopped.
“Don’t come in,” she said to the old count, who was following her, “after,” and she closed the door behind her.
The count put his ear to the lock and began to listen.
At first he heard the sounds of indifferent speeches, then one sound of Anna Mikhaylovna's voice speaking a long speech, then a cry, then silence, then again both voices spoke together with joyful intonations, and then footsteps, and Anna Mikhaylovna opened the door for him. On the face of Anna Mikhailovna there was a proud expression of a cameraman who had completed a difficult amputation and was leading the public in so that they could appreciate his art.
- C "est fait! [It's done!] - she said to the count, pointing solemnly at the countess, who held a snuffbox with a portrait in one hand, a letter in the other and pressed her lips first to one, then to the other.
Seeing the count, she stretched out her arms to him, hugged his bald head, and through the bald head again looked at the letter and portrait, and again, in order to press them to her lips, slightly pushed the bald head away. Vera, Natasha, Sonya and Petya entered the room and the reading began. The letter briefly described the campaign and two battles in which Nikolushka participated, promotion to officers and said that he kisses the hands of maman and papa, asking for their blessings, and kisses Vera, Natasha, Petya. In addition, he bows to Mr. Sheling, and to mme Shos and the nurse, and, in addition, asks to kiss dear Sonya, whom he still loves and remembers in the same way. On hearing this, Sonya blushed so that tears came into her eyes. And, unable to endure the looks that turned on her, she ran into the hall, ran away, whirled, and, inflating her dress with a balloon, flushed and smiling, sat down on the floor. The Countess was crying.
“What are you crying about, maman?” Vera said. - Everything that he writes should be rejoicing, not crying.
It was perfectly fair, but the count, the countess, and Natasha all looked at her reproachfully. “And who did she turn out like that!” thought the countess.
Nikolushka's letter was read hundreds of times, and those who were considered worthy to listen to him had to come to the countess, who did not let go of him. Tutors, nannies, Mitenka, some acquaintances came, and the countess reread the letter each time with new pleasure and each time discovered new virtues in her Nikolushka from this letter. How strange, unusual, how joyful it was for her that her son was the son who, almost noticeably tiny members, moved in her 20 years ago, the son for whom she quarreled with the spoiled count, the son who had learned to say before: “ pear ”, and then“ woman ”, that this son is now there, in a foreign land, in a foreign environment, a courageous warrior, alone, without help and guidance, is doing some kind of masculine business there. The entire world age-old experience, indicating that children imperceptibly from the cradle become husbands, did not exist for the countess. The maturation of her son in every season of maturation was just as extraordinary for her, as if there had never been millions of millions of people who had matured in the same way. Just as she couldn’t believe 20 years ago that that little creature that lived somewhere under her heart would scream and begin to suckle her breast and begin to speak, so now she couldn’t believe that this same creature could be that strong, a brave man, a model of sons and people, which he was now, judging by this letter.
- What a calm, as he describes cute! she said, reading the descriptive part of the letter. And what a soul! Nothing about me… nothing! About some Denisov, but he himself, it’s true, is braver than all of them. He writes nothing about his sufferings. What a heart! How do I recognize him! And how I remembered everyone! Didn't forget anyone. I always, always said, even when he was like this, I always said ...
For more than a week they prepared, wrote brillons and wrote letters to Nikolushka from the whole house in a clean copy; under the supervision of the countess and the care of the count, the necessary gizmos and money were collected for the uniform and equipment of the newly promoted officer. Anna Mikhailovna, a practical woman, managed to arrange protection for herself and her son in the army, even for correspondence. She had the opportunity to send her letters to the Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, who commanded the guard. The Rostovs assumed that the Russian guards abroad had a completely definitive address, and that if the letter reached the Grand Duke, who commanded the guards, then there was no reason that it should not reach the Pavlograd regiment, which should be nearby; and therefore it was decided to send letters and money through the courier of the Grand Duke to Boris, and Boris was already supposed to deliver them to Nikolushka. Letters were from the old count, from the countess, from Petya, from Vera, from Natasha, from Sonya and, finally, 6,000 money for uniforms and various things that the count sent to his son.

On November 12, the Kutuzov military army, camped near Olmutz, was preparing for the next day for a review of two emperors - Russian and Austrian. The guards, who had just arrived from Russia, spent the night 15 versts from Olmutz and the next day, right at the review, by 10 o'clock in the morning, entered the Olmutz field.
Nikolai Rostov on that day received a note from Boris informing him that the Izmailovsky regiment was spending the night 15 miles short of Olmutz, and that he was waiting for him to hand over a letter and money. Rostov especially needed money now, when, having returned from the campaign, the troops stopped near Olmutz, and well-equipped scribblers and Austrian Jews, offering all sorts of temptations, filled the camp. Pavlohrad residents had feasts after feasts, celebrations of the awards received for the campaign and trips to Olmutz to the newly arrived Karolina Vengerka, who opened a tavern with female servants there. Rostov recently celebrated his production of cornets, bought a Bedouin, Denisov's horse, and was indebted to his comrades and sutlers all around. Having received a note from Boris, Rostov and his friend went to Olmutz, dined there, drank a bottle of wine, and went alone to the guards camp in search of his childhood friend. Rostov has not had time to get dressed yet. He was wearing a worn cadet jacket with a soldier's cross, the same breeches lined with worn leather, and an officer's saber with a lanyard; the horse on which he rode was a Don one, bought on a campaign from a Cossack; the crumpled hussar cap was smartly put on back and to one side. Approaching the camp of the Izmailovsky regiment, he thought about how he would hit Boris and all his fellow guardsmen with his fired fighting hussar look.
The guards went through the whole campaign as if on a festivities, flaunting their cleanliness and discipline. The transitions were small, satchels were carried on carts, the Austrian authorities prepared excellent dinners for the officers at all the transitions. The regiments entered and left the cities with music, and the whole campaign (which the guardsmen were proud of), by order of the Grand Duke, people walked in step, and the officers walked in their places. Boris walked and stood with Berg, now a company commander, all the time of the campaign. Berg, having received a company during the campaign, managed to earn the trust of his superiors with his diligence and accuracy and arranged his economic affairs very profitably; During the campaign, Boris made many acquaintances with people who could be useful to him, and through a letter of recommendation he brought from Pierre, he met Prince Andrei Bolkonsky, through whom he hoped to get a place in the headquarters of the commander in chief. Berg and Boris, clean and neatly dressed, having rested after the last day's march, sat in the clean apartment allotted to them in front of a round table and played chess. Berg held a smoking pipe between his knees. Boris, with his usual accuracy, with his white thin hands placed the checkers like a pyramid, waiting for Berg's move, and looked at his partner's face, apparently thinking about the game, as he always thought only about what he was doing.
- Well, how will you get out of this? - he said.
“We will try,” answered Berg, touching the pawn and lowering his hand again.
At this time, the door opened.
“Here he is at last,” shouted Rostov. And Berg is here! Oh, petizanfan, ale kushe dormir, [Children, go to bed,] he shouted, repeating the words of the nanny, over which they once laughed with Boris.
- Fathers! how you have changed! - Boris stood up to meet Rostov, but, getting up, he did not forget to support and put the falling chess pieces in their place and wanted to hug his friend, but Nikolai moved away from him. With that special feeling of youth, which is afraid of beaten roads, wants, without imitating others, to express their feelings in a new way, in their own way, if only not in the way that the elders often express it feignedly, Nikolai wanted to do something special when meeting with a friend : he wanted to somehow pinch, push Boris, but just not kiss in any way, as everyone did. Boris, on the contrary, calmly and friendly embraced and kissed Rostov three times.
They had not seen each other for almost half a year; and at the age when young people take their first steps on the path of life, both found in each other great changes, completely new reflections of the societies in which they took their first steps in life. Both had changed a lot since their last meeting, and both wanted to quickly show each other the changes that had taken place in them.
“Oh, you damn floor polishers! Clean, fresh, as if from a walk, not like we are sinners, the army, ”said Rostov with baritone sounds new to Boris in his voice and army tricks, pointing to his breeches spattered with mud.
The German hostess leaned out of the door at the loud voice of Rostov.
- What, pretty? he said with a wink.
- Why are you screaming like that! You will scare them,” said Boris. “But I didn’t expect you today,” he added. - Yesterday, I just gave you a note through a friend of Kutuzovsky's adjutant - Bolkonsky. I did not think that he would deliver to you so soon ... Well, how are you? Already shot? Boris asked.
Rostov, without answering, shook the soldier's St. George's cross hanging on the laces of his uniform, and, pointing to his bandaged hand, smiling, looked at Berg.
“As you can see,” he said.
- That's how, yes, yes! - Boris said smiling, - and we also made a glorious campaign. After all, you know, his highness constantly rode with our regiment, so that we had all the conveniences and all the benefits. In Poland, what kind of receptions there were, what kind of dinners, balls - I can’t tell you. And the Tsarevich was very merciful to all our officers.
And both friends told each other - one about their hussar revels and military life, the other about the pleasantness and benefits of serving under the command of high-ranking officials, etc.
- O Guard! Rostov said. “Well, let’s go get some wine.”
Boris winced.
“If you really want to,” he said.
And, going up to the bed, he took out a purse from under the clean pillows and ordered to bring wine.
“Yes, and give you the money and the letter,” he added.
Rostov took the letter and, throwing money on the sofa, leaned his elbows on the table with both hands and began to read. He read a few lines and looked angrily at Berg. Meeting his gaze, Rostov covered his face with a letter.
“However, they sent you a decent amount of money,” Berg said, looking at the heavy purse pressed into the sofa. - Here we are with a salary, count, making our way. I'll tell you about myself...
“That’s what, my dear Berg,” said Rostov, “when you receive a letter from home and meet your man, whom you want to ask about everything, and I’ll be here, I’ll leave now so as not to disturb you. Listen, go away, please, somewhere, somewhere ... to hell! he shouted, and at once, grabbing him by the shoulder and looking affectionately into his face, apparently trying to soften the rudeness of his words, he added: “you know, don’t be angry; dear, my dear, I speak from the bottom of my heart, as to our old acquaintance.
“Ah, pardon me, Count, I understand very well,” said Berg, getting up and speaking to himself in a throaty voice.
- You go to the owners: they called you, - Boris added.
Berg put on a clean frock coat, without a spot or a speck, fluffed up the temples in front of the mirror, as Alexander Pavlovich wore, and, convinced by Rostov's look that his frock coat had been noticed, with a pleasant smile he left the room.
- Oh, what a beast I am, however! - said Rostov, reading the letter.
- And what?
- Oh, what a pig I am, however, that I never wrote and so scared them. Oh, what a pig I am,” he repeated, suddenly blushing. - Well, send Gavrila for wine! Okay, enough! - he said…
In the letters of the relatives, there was also a letter of recommendation to Prince Bagration, which, on the advice of Anna Mikhailovna, the old countess got through her acquaintances and sent to her son, asking him to take it down for its intended purpose and use it.
- That's nonsense! I really need it, - said Rostov, throwing the letter under the table.
- Why did you leave it? Boris asked.
- What a letter of recommendation, the devil is in my letter!
- What the hell is in the letter? - Boris said, raising and reading the inscription. This letter is very important for you.
“I don’t need anything, and I’m not going to be an adjutant to anyone.
- From what? Boris asked.
- Lackey position!
“You are still the same dreamer, I see,” said Boris, shaking his head.
“And you are still a diplomat. Well, that's not the point ... Well, what are you? Rostov asked.
- Yes, as you can see. So far so good; but I confess that I would very much like to become adjutant, and not remain in the front.
- What for?
- Because, having already once gone through the career of military service, one should try to make, if possible, a brilliant career.
- Yes, that's how! - said Rostov, apparently thinking of something else.
He looked intently and inquiringly into the eyes of his friend, apparently in vain looking for a solution to some question.
Old Gavrilo brought wine.
- Shouldn't we send for Alfons Karlych now? Boris said. He will drink with you, but I can't.
- Go-go! Well, what is this nonsense? Rostov said with a contemptuous smile.
“He is a very, very good, honest and pleasant person,” said Boris.
Rostov once again looked intently into Boris's eyes and sighed. Berg returned, and over a bottle of wine, the conversation between the three officers brightened up. The guards told Rostov about their campaign, about how they were honored in Russia, Poland and abroad. They told about the words and deeds of their commander, the Grand Duke, anecdotes about his kindness and temper. Berg, as usual, was silent when the matter did not concern him personally, but on the occasion of anecdotes about the irascibility of the Grand Duke, he told with pleasure how in Galicia he managed to talk with the Grand Duke when he went around the regiments and was angry for the wrong movement. With a pleasant smile on his face, he told how the Grand Duke, very angry, rode up to him and shouted: “Arnauts!” (Arnauts - was the favorite saying of the Tsarevich when he was angry) and demanded a company commander.
“Believe me, count, I was not afraid of anything, because I knew that I was right. You know, Count, without boasting, I can say that I know the orders for the regiment by heart and I also know the charter, like our Father in heaven. Therefore, count, there are no omissions in my company. Here is my conscience and calm. I came. (Berg half stood up and imagined in his faces how he appeared with his hand to the visor. Indeed, it was difficult to portray in a face more respectful and self-satisfied.) Already he pushed me, as they say, push, push; pushed not on the stomach, but on death, as they say; and "Arnauts", and devils, and to Siberia, - said Berg, smiling shrewdly. - I know that I'm right, and therefore I am silent: isn't it, Count? "What, are you dumb, or what?" he screamed. I keep silent. What do you think, Count? The next day it was not even in the order: that's what it means not to get lost. So, count, - said Berg, lighting his pipe and blowing rings.
"Yes, that's nice," said Rostov, smiling.
But Boris, noticing that Rostov was going to laugh at Berg, artfully dismissed the conversation. He asked Rostov to tell how and where he received the wound. Rostov was pleased, and he began to tell, during the story he became more and more animated. He told them his Shengraben affair in exactly the same way as those who took part in them usually tell about the battles, that is, the way they would like it to be, the way they heard from other storytellers, the way it was more beautiful to tell, but not at all. the way it was. Rostov was a truthful young man; he would never deliberately tell a lie. He began to tell with the intention of telling everything exactly as it happened, but imperceptibly, involuntarily and inevitably for himself, he turned into a lie. If he had told the truth to these listeners, who, like himself, had already heard stories of attacks many times and formed a definite idea of what an attack was, and expected exactly the same story, or they would not believe him, or, even worse, they would think that Rostov himself was to blame for the fact that what happened to him did not happen to him, which usually happens to the narrators of cavalry attacks. He could not tell them so simply that they all went at a trot, he fell off his horse, lost his arm and ran with all his might into the forest from the Frenchman. In addition, in order to tell everything as it happened, one had to make an effort on oneself to tell only what happened. Telling the truth is very difficult; and young people are rarely capable of it. They were waiting for a story about how he was on fire all over, not remembering himself, like a storm, he flew on a square; how he cut into him, chopped right and left; how the saber tasted the meat, and how he fell exhausted, and the like. And he told them all this.

Who was Oleg Penkovsky really: an ordinary renegade and a spy who never saved the world, or an outstanding intelligence officer who did a great service for the benefit of all mankind? In my notes "From the KGB to the FSB" I seem to have given a completely exhaustive answer to the question I have just posed. And this answer was this: Oleg Penkovsky is a former officer of the Soviet army who committed high treason in the early 1960s (who betrayed the Motherland, in the terminology of those years), was exposed by state security agencies and shot in accordance with the laws of that time.

It would seem, well, what else can be added to the above? But, no, it turns out that you can add a lot more. In a word, it is clearly premature to close this topic, and here's why.

There are two books on my desktop (not in a computer, but on a real wooden table). Both were published in 2016. One of them is called "Legendary scouts. On the front line far from the front - foreign intelligence during the Great Patriotic War. The book was published by the Young Guard publishing house, in the Life of Remarkable People series. The author is Nikolai Dolgopolov.

The second book, published by the Enlightenment publishing house and entitled Notes from a Suitcase, as follows from the announcement on the cover, is a project by Alexander Khinshtein. The author of the notes themselves is Ivan Serov, the first chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, then the head of the GRU, an army general. After the exposure of the spy Penkovsky - an employee of the GRU - Serov was demoted to major general, deprived of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, which he was awarded for the heroic leadership of offensive operations during the capture of Berlin, and as a result - expelled from the ranks of the CPSU. Passed away in 1990. Actually, Khinshtein, in my opinion, could rightly be called a co-author of the book, but that's not what we are talking about now.

The link, as it were, connecting both books is the personality of the already mentioned Penkovsky, who appears as a character in both works. Immediately, I hasten to make a reservation that Penkovsky does not belong to the galaxy of legendary scouts in any way. And if Nikolai Dolgopolov mentions him in his book, it is only because in an essay dedicated to the former employee of the First Main Directorate of the KGB, who took an active part in the partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War, Colonel Ivan Dedula, the author puts forward a rather unexpected version of exposing the traitor.

This version lies in the fact that, according to the author, who refers to the information received from the hero of the essay, the primary data on Penkovsky's espionage activities were obtained from Ivan Dedyuli when he worked in the KGB residency in Austria. And it was this information, received by the Soviet intelligence officer through a certain employee of the Austrian special services, that made it possible to take the traitor into active development. The essay about the scout Dedyula is called: "Partizan caught Penkovsky." It must be said that the title given to the essay sounds very loud, but at the same time it absolutely does not correspond to the essence of the matter.

I am not at all inclined to sharply criticize Nikolai Mikhailovich, whom I know as a conscientious writer and historian of the special services, but still I have to make a number of remarks.

First of all, I responsibly declare that a whole team of intelligence and counterintelligence officers always works in the matter of exposing foreign intelligence agents. Surveillance officers and operational and technical workers are connected to them as necessary, and finally, at the stage of completion of development, investigators. To single out one particular operative from among dozens of others working side by side with him, and to say that it was he who exposed the spy, is most often simply impossible, and from an operational point of view, it is unethical.

As for the direct exposure of the Penkovsky spy, in this case, too, numerous KGB officers of various profiles took part in the activities for its development. At the same time, I take the liberty of declaring that one of the main roles in this matter was played by surveillance agents; it was they, in my opinion, who were the first to obtain information that directly convicted Penkovsky of espionage. But, one way or another, I can’t say that it was they (or one of their brigade) who exposed, or, even more so, “caught” the spy Penkovsky.

Regarding the version of Ivan Dedyula, which Nikolai Dolgopolov told readers about, I can say the following. At one time, having carefully studied the case of the operational development of the US-British agent Penkovsky, as well as the criminal case initiated against Penkovsky under article 64, paragraph "A" of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (treason in the form of espionage), I do not remember that they contained references to a message from the residency in Austria about the connection of the already mentioned Penkovsky with foreign intelligence services. I do not want to say that such a fact did not exist at all. Most likely, there was, and everything was exactly as described in Dolgopolov's essay, but I would not attach excessive importance to this fact.

At this point, I put an end to it and move on to the second episode of the chapter on the far from the most prominent spy of the twentieth century. I will not hide the fact that the so-called Notes from the Suitcase, in the part directly related to Penkovsky, are written and presented in the book in such a way that it is not so easy to understand them. This requires thoughtful and painstaking work. However, let's start...

The book contains rather sketchy, Serov's own thoughts about Penkovsky. Contrary to the materials kept in the archives of the FSB and the testimony of many eyewitnesses, the former head of the KGB and the GRU completely denies his close acquaintance with Penkovsky, and most importantly, the fact of his participation in the restoration of Penkovsky in the military intelligence service in 1959. The second, fundamentally important, in my opinion, moment is Serov's opinion about Penkovsky's belonging to the KGB agents. It is with discussions on these questions that I would like to begin my comments on the book, and I want to start not with the first, but with the second.

Judging by the notes, Serov had no doubt that Penkovsky was a KGB agent. Well, it is quite possible, although, as they say, history is silent about this. The main thing is that none of the historians and publicists have seen any documents confirming or refuting this version. Well, even if he was once recruited by the KGB, it does not matter in order to understand who Penkovsky really was and what kind of intelligence he really worked for. By the way (if, again, judging by the notes he left), Serov had no doubt that Penkovsky worked for the intelligence of Western countries, and quite conscientiously. Here, for example, is his opinion on Penkovsky, included by Khinshtein in Chapter 22 of Notes from a Suitcase:

“In May 1962, seeing that the KGB’s idea of sending to the USA was not successful, then an employee of a special department [of] came to me and asked me “to speak at a meeting and praise P[enkovsky] for good work etc., to give him confidence that he is not suspected.”

I indignantly rejected this chatter and said that there was nothing to delay with his development, but that he should be summoned and interrogated, and I have no doubt that he should confess. However, they did not listen to my advice, since their plans were broader, i.e. compromise me to the detriment of state interests and until October 1962, i.e. For 6 months, without any need, they “developed” it, creating conditions for work in favor of foreign intelligence, if only to carry out the planned plan against me. It's clear to me now."

I don’t know why Ivan Alexandrovich decided that the KGB allegedly planned in 1962 to send Penkovsky on a business trip to the United States, because in fact, at that time, under any pretext, he was taken away from all kinds of trips abroad. In addition to being removed from a business trip to the United States, KGB officers prevented him from leaving for Brazil, Israel and Cyprus. But in general, the idea - to publicly express praise to Penkovsky - does not look at all as ridiculous as Serov tried to portray. As for the development of Penkovsky, I am ready to state quite responsibly that the opera from the KGB did not "pull", but acted "with feeling, with sense, with the arrangement." By the way, at that time everything possible was done to limit the spy's access to secrets to a minimum and to narrow his circle of communication with foreign citizens. If, however, it was impossible to prevent contact with a foreigner, then Penkovsky was thoroughly furnished, not allowing him to take an extra step.

As for the "clear as day" plan, developed, as Serov believed, to compromise him, then there is something to speculate about. Whether such a plan existed or not, I do not presume to judge. I also don’t want to talk about what the need was for sure to deal with a very extraordinary person, what Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov really was - this topic is clearly beyond the scope of this story. However, I fully admit that such a plan really existed, and Shelepin and Semichastny were its main executors. But, one way or another, the actions of counterintelligence officers (not politicians from the KGB, but real counterintelligence officers) from January to October 1962 were aimed solely at obtaining the most complete information about the criminal activities of the CIA agent and SIS Penkovsky. I do not rule out that Serov's ill-wishers took advantage of the current situation to settle scores with him, but this action unfolded, as it were, in parallel with the development of the spy, and, accordingly, has no direct relation to the Penkovsky case.

I willingly admit that Serov and Penkovsky never had close relations, and even more so, friendship, although, nevertheless, the spy managed to get close to his family members by hook or by crook. But this is not the main thing, the question of the degree of Serov's guilt in the restoration of Penkovsky in the intelligence service is much more important. Let us turn, first of all, to the opinion of Serov himself on this issue, which he expressed in the Party Control Committee (CPC) under the Central Committee of the CPSU in February 1964 when discussing the transfer of Penkovsky to the GRU. However, first I want to note that in Serov's explanation given at the meeting of the CPC, Varentsov appears, about whom a few words should be said.

Sergey Sergeevich Varentsov, a prominent Soviet military leader, during the Great Patriotic War commanded artillery on a number of fronts, in the post-war years he commanded the artillery of the Soviet army, and in 1961 he became commander of the artillery and missile forces of the Ground Forces, chief marshal of artillery. Penkovsky gained confidence in Varentsov during the war, became his adjutant, enjoyed his patronage until his failure as an agent of foreign intelligence. After Penkovsky was exposed, Varentsov, like Serov, was demoted to major general and stripped of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

By the way, Alexander Khinshtein erroneously calls Varentsov in a number of cases the commander-in-chief of the missile forces and artillery - there has never been such a position in the Soviet army. Penkovsky himself, who, as already noted above, was Varentsov's adjutant, was once demoted by the author to an orderly ...

However, let's finally give the floor to Ivan Serov:

“Some time later Varentsov called me, apparently after he became aware of my negative attitude towards the reception of Penkovsky(in the GRU - ed.).

Varentsov began to praise Penkovsky, that he had known him for decades on a good side, that he had fought. I objected to Varentsov, pointing out that he had a bad attestation in the [military] attache. In response, he said that he was now completing rocket courses and had an excellent record, and asked to consider this issue again.

I instructed Smolikov (deputy head of the GRU - ed.) to check and collect all the materials. At the end of the conversation, he said that Varentsov also called him.

In the future, Comrade Smolikov came again with documents and a certificate on Penkovsky, from which it was clear that he had been dismissed by order of the head [chief] Gen. Headquarters, and then told Smolikov that he still did not agree.

A few days later, meeting me, Varentsov again praised Penkovsky, to which I replied that I could not add anything more to what I had said. I thought this question was over.

I did not give instructions to any of my subordinates either about admitting Penkovsky to the GRU, or about altering his attestation. This is confirmed by documents: an enrollment order signed by comrade Rogov, and an attestation signed by comrade Lyakhterov (head of the 4th department of the GRU - ed.) and approved by comrade Rogov.

Both of these documents were drawn up with violations of the existing order in the army for attestation and execution of orders.

The comrades who allowed it should be held accountable for this violation, but at the same time, I, as the head of the Main Directorate, treated these comrades with confidence and did not properly control their actions.

I learned a few months later that Penkovsky had been accepted and was working in the GRU, when I saw his name among the officers assigned to service the exhibition in Moscow.

I asked the head of the department, comrade Rogov, where Penkovsky came from, to which comrade Rogov answered that the cadres were dealing with him, and comrade Rogov (deputy head of the GRU), signed the order on the appointment ... ”.

What can be said about this explanation. First of all, it is impossible not to admit that Serov's guilt really took place, and it was not by chance that I singled out his words in the text, where he speaks directly about this. Frankly, I was seriously surprised by the order that prevailed in the GRU at the turn of the 50s and 60s of the last century. It turns out that the head of the Main Directorate gives clear instructions to his deputies, and they, taking advantage of the short absence of their boss, did everything in their own way, contrary to the order received.

But that is not all. Serov points out that a few months later he learned about Penkovsky's admission to the GRU. And what. Instead of taking decisive action and giving a proper rebuff to the personnel officers and his deputy Rogov, he seems to agree with their actions, waving his hand at everything ...

Serov was punished beyond all measure - here, it seems, there can be no two opinions. How was it possible to deprive a person of an award deservedly received during the war years? And exclusion from the ranks of the CPSU, by the standards of the 1960s, can only be compared with a conditional imprisonment ...

However, let us return directly to Penkovsky. On page 584 of Notes from the Suitcase, there is a footnote that reads:

“A negative assessment for Penkovsky based on the results of his work in the Turkish GRU residency was compiled by military attache Rubenko (real name Savchenko), a conflict with which led to an early recall home and expulsion from the military intelligence of the future traitor.”

I do not know who exactly the author of this footnote is: perhaps Alexander Khinshtein, or perhaps the editor from the Prosveshchenie publishing house. But, one way or another, I believe that the text of this footnote was agreed with the project manager, that is, with Alexander Evseevich. But, what is interesting: in this phrase Oleg Penkovsky is unambiguously called a traitor, albeit a future one, but a traitor! A little earlier Khinshtein had the following thought:

“Yes, honestly, Serov should have been punished for betraying his subordinate. But what happened to him is more like a massacre. All of life turned out to be crossed out overnight ... ".

I fully agree with this opinion of Alexander, and earlier I myself expressed a similar idea. But I want to emphasize that the author uses the term "betrayal" in relation to Serov's subordinate, that is, to Penkovsky. Consequently, at the moment when he wrote these lines, he had no doubts that Penkovsky was a traitor.

It would seem that we can already put a bullet in this ordinary spy story and stop all sorts of disputes and rumors about the identity of the spy himself. However, it wasn't there...

In the 22nd chapter, which appears under the heading “Is Oleg Penkovsky a KGB agent? 1962-1963” (by the way, the previous quote is also taken from this chapter), the project leader notes:

“What Serov writes about is, without exaggeration, sensation. One of the most high-profile cases is presented by him in a completely different, unexpected perspective.

Now, it seems, the fun begins! True, I have to state bluntly that I did not notice any special sensationalism about Penkovsky in Serov's notes. For myself, I noted two new points. The first is that Serov, unlike Varentsov, was never a person close to Penkovsky and his patron. And the second is the opinion of the former Chairman of the KGB that Penkovsky was an agent of the same KGB, which he, Serov, had recently led.

Earlier, I noted that, in fact, in Serov's notes, Penkovsky is said rather sparingly and fragmentarily. There is, however, the need to single out one more thought of Serov, which he expresses on the pages of the so-called "entry No. 3". Speaking of Penkovsky, Serov directly calls him a "scoundrel" and suggests that "working for the Americans," he "was also a secret agent for the KGB." The quoted words once again confirm that Serov had no doubt that Penkovsky was an American spy, but the fact that he really was a scoundrel does not cause the slightest bewilderment in anyone. Regarding Serov's opinion that Penkovsky was a KGB agent and was used in a combination to discredit him, I have already expressed my point of view earlier and I consider it unnecessary to return to this issue again. Perhaps this is, in the opinion of Alexander Khinshtein, the very “sensation without exaggeration”.

In my opinion, however, the main sensation lies not in the notes made directly by Serov. The sensation is in Khinshtein's comments, and mainly in his essay, inserted into the book under the heading "Another Life of Oleg Penkovsky." Although this is also, how to look, because many of Khinshtein's thoughts have appeared more than once in one form or another in various works and opuses about Penkovsky. As I noted earlier, Alexander Khinshtein admitted at least twice that Penkovsky committed treason. And, nevertheless, as follows from the subsequent narrative, he has a special opinion about Penkovsky and his case, which I will try to understand.

I consider it necessary to start not even with an essay, but with a lengthy commentary, with which Alexander Evseevich precedes the 22nd chapter of Notes from a Suitcase. First of all, I highlight the thought of the author of the commentary (or co-author of the Notes), where he notes "a lot of inconsistencies and oddities in the Penkovsky case, which historians for some reason try to ignore." And then he continues:

“For 8 months, trying to establish contact with foreign intelligence, Penkovsky fearlessly made 6 initiative approaches to foreigners, 5 times tried to hand over secret documents and visited their hotel rooms 3 times.

After recruiting, within 6 months, he held at least 10 meetings in Moscow with Anna Chisholm, the wife of the MI6 resident, and all of them in crowded places. Counterintelligence again was not noticed.

When, finally, the "outdoor" KGB records the secret contacts of the GRU colonel with the wife of the resident, another 10 months will pass before Penkovsky is arrested. Although during this time he will give the enemy at least 30 microfilms with top secret information, including about Soviet missiles in Cuba.

I do not presume to judge what sources Alexander Khinshtein used when he gave out the above calculations, and also wrote his essay on the topic that Penkovsky had a “different life”, but I am ready to say that the lion's share of these sources does not withstand any criticism.

By the way, the famous literary character from the novel "12 Chairs" Ostap Bender once expressed such a wise thought: "Soon only cats will be born." I would like to remind those same words to those who believe that the period of active development of the Penkovsky spy was greatly delayed. No, it lasted exactly as long as was necessary in order to thoroughly understand all the vicissitudes of the espionage business and carefully document all the illegal actions of a foreign agent. After that, all the collected materials could be presented in full in court as evidence of the crimes committed by Penkovsky.

For example, in the process of painstaking work of the employees of the State Security Committee, about 200 connections of the spy were revealed, among which about 40 people were his close acquaintances. Among the acquaintances there were many officers and generals of the Soviet Army, most of whom were secret bearers. In particular, many of his connections were revealed, which he actively used to obtain secret information “in the dark”. Often, wanting to get some information, Penkovsky, without a shadow of a doubt, covered himself with the name of Marshal Varentsov, who allegedly instructed him to collect data on a particular issue.

Khinshtein notes that for more than half a year, Penkovsky persistently sought contact with Western intelligence agents and, at the same time, "fearlessly" made approaches to them. In general, there is nothing supernatural in this, since at that moment a ready-made candidate for foreign agents held a considerable cover position in the Foreign Relations Department of the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research (SC R&D), which gave him considerable opportunities to maintain permanent contacts with foreigners.

By the way, for the first time Penkovsky came to the attention of the state security agencies in early January 1961. Then information was received about his contact with the trade adviser of the Embassy of Canada in Moscow Van Vliet (Khinshtein mistakenly calls him Van Vlie, but I believe that this is of no fundamental importance) and another Canadian citizen temporarily staying in Moscow. Some of the details that appeared in Penkovsky's conversation with the Canadians gave certain grounds to suspect him of espionage. But then Penkovsky was rescued by the GRU, according to which their employee was developing the very Canadian citizen who arrived in Moscow for a short time.

A little later, Penkovsky's connection with the Englishman Greville Wynne, suspicious from the point of view of the KGB officers, was recorded. However, in this case, the Main Intelligence Directorate tried to attribute everything to its operational interest in the British merchant. In reality, however, things did not go so smoothly, and Penkovsky's relationship with Wynn was ultimately an important factor in the undertaking to expose the spy.

By the way, Greville Wynn was not a British intelligence officer, he was an SIS agent. He was recruited at the moment when the businessman, who Wynn really was, had a close contact with Penkovsky. I must say that they recruited him rather rudely using blackmail; specifically, he was told that in case of refusal, he could consider his career as a businessman ended ...

Unlike Penkovsky's contacts with Van Vliet and Wynn, his relations with Anna Chisholm were built on a purely conspiratorial basis, and their meetings took place far from being in such crowded places as A.E. Khinshtein. However, I propose to look at the situation that has developed in the relations between the British intelligence officer and the former Soviet officer who committed high treason, from a somewhat unusual point of view.

We will proceed from the fact that Penkovsky is not an agent of two Western intelligence services at all, but a completely respectable Soviet officer who played the role of a "spoiled Cossack" prescribed by the scenario of the USSR State Security Committee to resolve certain issues of national importance. It is this role that Alexander Khinshtein tries on for a reborn and a traitor in his essay “Another Life of Oleg Penkovsky”. And what do we get in this case?

It turns out that's what. Penkovsky, acting under the control of the KGB and in full agreement with it, not embarrassed by anything or anyone, meets with Anna Chisholm quite freely in places full of unnecessary witnesses. And this, from the point of view of Khinshtein and other authors who argue that Penkovsky carried out a particularly responsible task of the Soviet government, is quite natural. However, how can we deal with the opposite side? Anna Chisholm, by the logic of those events, should have been quite sure that Penkovsky was not a double agent at all, but a person wholly devoted to the ideals of the Free World and conscientiously fulfilling the instructions of the intelligence of the United Kingdom. And if so, then how could she make such a mistake and meet with her "faithful agent" several times in completely inappropriate places for this? Probably, Ms. Chisholm herself knew a lot about the intricacies of intelligence craft, but her husband, Roderick Chisholm, who had full information about working with Penkovsky, became even more skilled in these matters. And both of them, count from time to time, made the same gross mistake!

All this, however, belongs to the category of my “speculations” or, more correctly, “fantasies” on a given topic. In fact, everything did not look quite like that, or, more correctly, not at all like that.

However, I will give one more argument in favor of the fact that Penkovsky was not framed by the state security agencies of the Soviet Union for the Anglo-American intelligence services in order to disinform them, but was the purest initiative, acting at his own peril and risk in favor of Western intelligence. In the summer of 1962, intelligence received information that the Soviet Union was going to pay another visit to Greville Wynn to negotiate with the leadership of the KNIR Group on organizing an exhibition of electronic equipment in Moscow. As the operational source emphasized, in resolving this issue, Penkovsky, referring to the interest of the GRU in the arrival of the Englishman, showed particular zeal to convince the leadership of the state committee to agree to the proposal without fail.

The conclusion suggested itself that Wynn was not just going to come to Moscow. Most likely, he was to become the new SIS liaison to work with Penkovsky. This conclusion looked all the more convincing since it all boiled down to Penkovsky's transition to a new method of communication. Not without the participation of the State Security Committee, Wynn was allowed to enter the USSR.

Penkovsky took over the entire organizational part of the Englishman's visit to Moscow. He also rented a room for him at the Ukraine Hotel. Despite the fact that this room was pre-equipped with everything necessary, it was not possible to listen to the conversations of the messenger with the agent .... Penkovsky's intelligence experience was useful to him this time too - all the negotiations that they conducted between themselves took place with the use of security measures that made it difficult to listen. They were conducted either with the radio turned on at full volume, or in the bathroom with water flowing from the tap.

The problem asks: if Penkovsky acted under the control of the KGB, then why the hell did he need to apply the entire arsenal of security measures in order to exclude wiretapping by the KGB, on which, according to Alexander Evseevich, set out in his essay, this very Penkovsky and have worked? Or, in this way, did he want to once again demonstrate to the British intelligence officer that he was “devoted to the ideals of the West in body and soul” and therefore had to exercise maximum caution? All this could have been so if the nature of Penkovsky's conversation with Wynn, which nevertheless managed to be deciphered in general terms, did not indicate that Penkovsky was in fact a traitor. And he took precautionary measures because he was really aware of the danger threatening him, and a considerable one at that.

To finish with A. Khinshtein's comments, I consider it necessary to give my own explanations to two footnotes (author's or editorial - I don't know) on page 579 of Notes from a Suitcase. According to the first footnote, "the fact of O. Penkovsky's betrayal was established already at the beginning of 1962." And the second footnote says: “In December 1961, KGB surveillance officers recorded O. Penkovsky’s contact with an English intelligence officer”. All this seems to be true, but not quite.

Let's start from the second position. I declare with all responsibility that in December 1961, the entry of the British intelligence officer Chisholm into the entrance was clearly recorded, where a suspicious man also entered, who, apparently, was performing a communications operation. However, to assert that this man was Penkovsky at that moment was clearly premature, since after a while the surveillance scouts missed him. In January 1962, well-founded suspicions appeared that Penkovsky was closely connected with British intelligence in the person of Anna Chisholm, but these were only primary data that had to be checked and rechecked ...

But here again an interesting point arises. According to Alexander Khinshtein, it turns out that at the beginning of 1962 the fact of Penkovsky's betrayal was established. Well, everything seems to be. There is nothing more to say, except for the details. Namely: when it was necessary to arrest him, when to “press him to the nail” and wrest confessions from the traitor. By the way, Serov himself also wrote about this in his notes. We can quote exactly what he said from the so-called Entry No. 2:

"I ... told (to an employee of the special department - ed. note) that there was nothing to delay with his development, but that he should be called and interrogated, and I have no doubt that he should confess."

This dialogue took place between the former Chairman of the KGB Serov, who served in the state security agencies for more than a dozen years, with an ordinary employee of the special department of the KGB in May 1962. In other words, the general of the army gives the officer (several ranks below him) an indication of how to act in any case was impossible. For at that moment, when the main strokes of the treacherous activity of the spy Penkovsky began to emerge in general terms, it was necessary to clearly document everything to the last detail.

How can one not recall the words of the character of the novel by Vladimir Bogomolov "In August forty-fourth ...", the head of the Smersh front department, Lieutenant General Yegorov: “Military operations most often produce corpses. And we need moment of truth! In principle, the situation in the novel is somewhat different from the real situation with Penkovsky's development. But a certain analogy can still be found ...

In the end, the development of the Penkovsky spy was brought to its logical end, that is, to the moment of truth, and the end of the (very bleak) spy is known ... But be that as it may, Alexander Khinshtein, out of nowhere, has a completely new version, which he sets out in the same essay, which, as we already know, is called “The Other Life of Oleg Penkovsky”. I called this version new and, of course, sinned against the truth. No, the version that Penkovsky is not a traitor, but a man who selflessly performed his military duty is not at all new.

For example, in 2013, the Veche publishing house published the book The Secret Side of the Penkovsky Case. Russia's unrecognized victory. The author of the book is a retired Captain 1st rank Anatoly Maksimov, an honorary member of the State Security Service, who served in the First Main Directorate of the KGB (foreign intelligence). There is a curious moment in his official biography. In 1971, after appropriate training, he entered the operational game "Tournament" with the Canadian special service of the RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police). On instructions from the leadership, he played the role of a set-up and was "recruited" by Canadian intelligence as an agent. The purpose of the operational game "Tournament" was to counter the Canadian operation "Gold Mine", which was carried out by the Canadian special services in the 1970s in order to obtain military and trade and economic secrets of the Soviet Union. Maksimov completed the task assigned to him, and in 1978 Operation Tournament was terminated.

Apparently, Anatoly Maksimov's own combat biography contributed to the fact that the author shifted some of its elements to Penkovsky's biography. In other words, in his own image and likeness, Maximov "blinded" a hero from Penkovsky, who was substituted for the intelligence services of Western countries to solve important strategic tasks.

Approximately the same role was prepared for Penkovsky by Alexander Khinshtein. And he begins his essay with these words:

“This man had three lives.
The first - a military officer, a front-line soldier, an order bearer.
The second is a traitor, a traitor, a decomposed drunkard.
The third is the savior of mankind from nuclear war.
But none of these lives are authentic."

Personally, I believe that every person has only one life. Yes, sometimes, due to circumstances, you have to lead a double life. And it was precisely such a double life that the traitor Oleg Penkovsky led in order to look quite decent in the face of his colleagues and superiors. Yes, a front-line soldier-order-bearer and a decomposed traitor are one and the same person who lived the beginning and end of his life so differently. I don’t want to talk about the “savior of mankind” at all, because I think that this epithet does not apply to our antihero in the least.

Now, it would seem, it is time to move on to the main part of Alexander Khinshtein's essay. However, you don't want to do that at all. It would be possible, of course, to dismantle the whole composition step by step, but I believe that this occupation is unlikely to be rewarding. After all, there will probably be hundreds of other writers who - in their own way - will turn over and turn over what has long become a classic of Soviet counterintelligence.

I perfectly understand the feelings of Ivan Serov, who, on the one hand, admits treason on the part of Penkovsky, and on the other, bluntly calls him a tool of the State Security Committee, who did everything possible to negate the long-term and, in general, impeccable service of the general. In the position in which he found himself in his declining years, he probably had no choice.

Earlier, I made the assumption that losing a party card for Serov was practically the same as receiving a suspended sentence. Or maybe not even conditional at all, but the most real?

I am trying to compare the fate of two generals from the state security department: Ivan Serov and Pavel Sudoplatov. A lot has already been said about Serov. And I wrote about Sudoplatov in sufficient detail earlier, but I want to briefly recall the milestones of his biography. Served as P.A. Sudoplatov faithfully until the death of Joseph Vissarionovich, and then overnight actually turned into an enemy of the people. He was deprived of all state awards, spent 15 years in the Vladimir Central, but 4 years before his death he was completely rehabilitated.

For both generals, the fate was not at all “sugar”. But the question is: which of them got it harder? Personally, I do not undertake to answer this question ...

I will try, however, to answer other questions, namely: why will passions for Penkovsky not subside in any way? Why, from time to time, from an ordinary traitor, it is imperative to make a hero-savior of mankind? Namely, Alexander Khinshtein tried to make a spy like that in his essay. Khinshtein prefaces the final part of his work with these words:

“I’ll make a reservation right away: what will be discussed now is nothing more than the fruit of my conclusions. However, these assumptions more than compensate for all the many oddities and mysteries with which the Penkovsky case is so rich.

In other words, my implausible version is much more plausible than the official canonical versions: both Western and domestic…”.

It is hardly necessary to describe in detail the role that Alexander Khinshtein has prepared for the spy Penkovsky. This can be said very briefly. The "Savior of mankind", according to Khinshtein, was not shot in 1963, since both the investigation and the trial were all supposedly a complete farce. He, as Alexander Evseevich believes, lived a long life under a different surname ...

Yes, don't say anything. The desire to somehow join the sensation, even if this very sensation does not exist at all, is apparently indestructible. Nothing human is alien to all of us, mere mortals. It turned out to be not alien to Alexander Evseevich.

Once again I repeat my thought: I have no desire to comment on his “implausible version”. I will cite, however, the words spoken by a former high-ranking KGB officer, retired colonel Viktor Ivanovich Cherkashin, who categorically rejects the thesis that Penkovsky was framed by the KGB for foreign intelligence. In the documentary series “Traitors with Andrei Lugovoi”, shown in 2014 on the Zvezda TV channel, Viktor Ivanovich says the following about Penkovsky:

“Quite often, the idea is expressed that Penkovsky was supposedly deliberately introduced to the British in order to mislead them. This is not true, because all the information he transmitted was secret. The Americans sometimes, through their setups, passed secret information to the enemy in order to interest him in this way, but we never had such a “fashion”.

No one would allow Penkovsky to pass on secret information about the military potential of the Soviet Union. It's out of the question!"

Colonel Cherkashin knows what he is talking about. The veteran of the organs had a chance to serve in the counterintelligence and intelligence units. In particular, he was one of those who participated in the development of the Penkovsky spy.

That, in fact, is all that should be said about Penkovsky. Although this topic seems to be truly endless, it is still time to know the honor.

In conclusion, it remains to say a few words about the book Notes from a Suitcase itself. The book certainly deserves a lot of attention. It is informative and, most importantly, it reveals many little-known or completely unknown pages of our recent history. The fact that such a book was published is a great merit of Alexander Khinshtein. Well, we will consider the episode concerning Penkovsky not the best page in the biography of Alexander Evseevich, a journalist and publicist.

Sergey GORLENKO

In the spring of 1961, British intelligence SIS recruited the largest and most effective Soviet agent of the Cold War era - Colonel Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky, a GRU officer who worked in the State Committee for Science and Technology the USSR.
The information obtained and transmitted by Penkovsky (about 5,500 frames filmed over a year and a half with a Minox microphoto camera) was of tremendous value. These were the latest data on Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, which turned out to be several thousand fewer than the United States thought, the levels of combat readiness, the sequence of checks and launches of Soviet strategic missiles, statistical data on the accuracy of hitting missiles and defects identified during fire tests.
The NATO leadership, having received Penkovsky's information that the role of the development of missiles and space weapons programs had grown in the USSR, seriously revised its strategy. At the most tense moments, twenty American and ten British analysts worked on processing the materials received from Penkovsky, who worked simultaneously for the SIS and the CIA ... 2
Who was Oleg Penkovsky and what were his motives for working for the three largest intelligence agencies in the world at once - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain?
Why did he need a betrayal, the real circumstances of which look like in a bad spy novel?
Who was he really?
Let's try to figure it out in this article...
Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky was born on April 23, 1919 in Vladikavkaz in an intelligent and wealthy family. His father graduated from the Warsaw University of Technology and worked as an engineer. The revolution, the Civil War did not bypass the family of Oleg Vladimirovich.

My father served in the White Army and died under unclear circumstances.
After graduating from a secondary school in Ordzhonikidze in 1937, he entered the Second Kiev Artillery School, which he successfully completed in 1939.
As a political officer of an artillery battery, he took part in the Polish and Finnish wars of 1939-1940.
Then - at the Komsomol work in the Moscow Artillery School (1940-1941) and the political department of the Moscow Military District (1941-1942).
From 1942 to 1943 he served as an officer for special assignments of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District.
From 1943 to 1944 - the head of the training detachment, and later the commander of the artillery battalion of the 27th artillery regiment of the 1st Ukrainian Front.
From 1944 to 1945 he was adjutant to the artillery commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front Varentsov, and later - the commander of the 51st Guards Artillery Regiment of the 1st Ukrainian Front.
After graduating from the Frunze Military Academy in 1948, Penkovsky held a number of positions in the Moscow Military District and the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
After studying at the Military Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Defense in 1949-1953, he goes to serve in the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army) and holds a number of positions:
1953-1955 - senior officer of the 4th Directorate of the GRU;
1955-1956 - Senior Assistant to the Military Attache at the USSR Embassy in Turkey, acted as a GRU resident in this country;
1956-1958 - senior officer of the 5th directorate of the GRU;
1958-1959 - training at the higher engineering courses of the Military Academy. Dzerzhinsky;
1959-1960 - senior officer of the 4th Directorate of the GRU;
1960 - senior officer of the special department of the 3rd directorate of the GRU;
1960-1962 - work "undercover" as deputy head of the Foreign Relations Department of the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
Here is such an impressive and respectful track record of a person who has gone through more than one war ...
By the way, he was awarded order Alexander Nevsky, which was given not only for outstanding leadership qualities, but also for personal courage in battle. And two more orders of the Red Banner, the Order of the Patriotic War of the first degree, the Order of the Red Star ...
Penkovsky belonged to the very top of the Soviet elite, was quite free in his actions, traveled abroad quite often, which was a rarity in those years.
Most of the information about what happened next is still classified as “secret”, so you have to be content with the official information that was once openly distributed both in the USSR and in the USA and Great Britain.
According to the official version, Colonel Penkovsky was a morally unstable person: he was very fond of women, money, booze, which is why he decided to pass secret information to the Americans and the British.
He was also a vengeful careerist who was ready to do anything to move up the career ladder. 7
It is very strange how such a degraded person could get the rank of colonel at the age of 30 and generally work in intelligence? ..
During his service, Penkovsky became disillusioned with the Soviet regime. He understood that Nikita Khrushchev, with his desire to spread communism throughout the world, was leading the country to destruction. Therefore, Penkovsky wanted to help prevent a nuclear war between the superpowers and volunteered to collect intelligence for the United States and Great Britain. eight
For the first time, he made contact with Western intelligence services in 1958, but the CIA then categorically refused to cooperate with him, believing that this was just a regular operation of the Soviet intelligence services.
Moreover, the CIA ordered all of its residencies not to make any contact with "this colonel." As it turned out later, professionals from American intelligence were alarmed by the very ideal biography of Penkovsky ...

On April 12, 1961, on the day of the flight of the first man into space, the first meeting of Colonel Penkovsky with a representative of British intelligence in Moscow took place.
Effective intelligence gathering was essential to the West in order to peacefully resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis even before Soviet missiles were deployed in Cuba.
In the summer of 1961, at a regular meeting with American and British intelligence officers in London, where Penkovsky arrived on a business trip, he tried on two military uniforms sewn for him with the insignia of a colonel of the British and American armed forces and was photographed in them.
At the same time, he received an assurance that after the end of espionage work on the territory of the USSR, he would be given a responsible position of his choice in the British or American military department with a salary of $ 2,000, and also paid a one-time remuneration for past espionage work at the rate of $ 1,000 for each month. .
At the same time, Penkovsky got acquainted with the forms of the necessary documents that would be filled out in his name as soon as he was in the West and expressed a desire to enter into English or American citizenship. ten
On September 20, 1961, as part of the Soviet delegation, Penkovsky arrived in Paris and, at the Le Bourget airport, handed over 15 exposed photographic films with spy materials filmed on them to the contact Winn.
In October 1961, while fulfilling the task of British and American intelligence, Penkovsky made a detailed description of the identity card of an officer of the Soviet Army and a badge with a personal number, compiled a description of the training program for students of one of the military academies, drew a diagram of the organization of this academy, compiled a list of generals and officers he knew with brief characteristics on them and on the evening of October 21, 1961, all these materials, together with the artillery charter he had, the "Manual on firing anti-aircraft artillery" and two military magazines for 1960, he handed over to a foreign intelligence liaison at a secret meeting near the Baltschug hotel. ten
October 14, 1962 American airplane The U-2 reconnaissance officer, who flew over Cuban territory, took the first pictures of launching positions under construction for Soviet ballistic missiles. CIA analysts were able to determine the nature of the structures thanks to secret documents that contained detailed information about the stages of construction of launch positions. These documents were secretly filmed by Penkovsky (Alex) at the Main Rocket and Artillery Directorate, where he managed to infiltrate thanks to his friendship with Chief Marshal of Artillery Varentsov.
On the trail of Penkovsky Second Main Directorate KGB(counterintelligence) came out quite by accident, while spying on the British embassy in 1962.
Until 1959, the KGB was of the opinion that Western intelligence services met with their agents only abroad, and on the territory of the Soviet Union they were limited only to communication through "mailboxes". But in October 1959, after the arrest of the GRU officer, Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Popov, who six years ago was recruited by the CIA in Vienna and transmitted information to his operator in Moscow “with one touch” (this is when two people seem to accidentally collide in a crowd), the head of the Second Chief General Oleg Mikhailovich Gribanov decided in 1960 to periodically organize surveillance of the US and British embassies.
These grandiose operations were carried out twice a year for two weeks, and surveillance was established both for embassy employees and for family members of diplomats, as well as for correspondents and businessmen living in Moscow. This surveillance was carried out, as a rule, by the forces of operational groups from the Seventh Directorate of the KGB (surveillance), but which acted on instructions from the Second Main Directorate.
So, in early 1962, one of these groups took under surveillance Janit Chisholm, the wife of the Moscow cameraman Penkovsky from the British intelligence SIS, just at the moment when she was leaving the embassy to receive another batch of microfilms from Penkovsky.
A one-touch contact between Chisholm and an unknown Russian was spotted by an observer from the Seventh Directorate in the Arbat area. Two of his colleagues followed Mrs. Chisholm all the way to the embassy, but since they were ordered not to reveal themselves, they did not stop her and did not demand that she give them the package she received.
Two other non-surveillance officers followed Penkovsky, but after twenty minutes they lost sight of him ...
From that moment on, the Second Main Directorate of the KGB already knew that the SIS had an agent in Moscow, but so far they had no information that would point to Penkovsky.
Shortly thereafter, Penkovsky's overconfidence brought him to the brink of failure. According to the established rules, all GRU and KGB officers who visited Western embassies had to coordinate their visits in advance with the Second Main Directorate. However, one day, going to a reception at the British Embassy, Penkovsky neglected this simple formality.

When the Second Main Directorate became indignant, the head of the GRU, General Serov, wrote a conciliatory letter on his own behalf to the head of the Second Directorate, asking him to hush up this misunderstanding. General Gribanov pretended to be satisfied with Serov's apology, but personally ordered that Penkovsky be placed under surveillance at home and at work.
With the help of a remote-controlled camera, which was installed in a flower box on the window of Penkovsky's neighbors, the Chekists managed to film how he carefully tunes the radio to a certain wave, listens to the transmission and then makes some notes.
Penkovsky committed another violation of the rules of conspiracy in July 1962, when an English businessman Greville Wynne, who was used by British intelligence as a courier, arrived in Moscow. They met in Winn's room at the Ukraina Hotel, and to drown out the conversation, Penkovsky turned on the radio in the room and turned on the taps in the bathroom.
But the technical experts of the Second Directorate still managed to decipher fragments of the conversation, and this was the first evidence that Penkovsky was engaged in espionage.
After sending the family, who lived on the floor above Penkovsky's apartment, on a vacation to the Black Sea, the Second Directorate drilled a small hole in the ceiling and installed a miniature pinhead-sized camera with which they were able to see how Penkovsky used the Minoks camera, codes and disposable encryption pads.
In order to conduct a detailed search of Penkovsky's apartment, a plan was developed in the Second Main Directorate of the KGB, which made it possible to lure him out of the house for several days. KGB toxicologists treated Penkovsky's stool with a special poisonous compound, after which Penkovsky became briefly, but very seriously ill. Doctors from the GRU, who had already been instructed, announced to him that he would have to go to the hospital for several days ...
During a search of Penkovsky's apartment, the KGB officers found ordinary espionage equipment, but they did not immediately arrest him, in the hope that, remaining at large, he would lead the Chekists to a large spy group.
Just as the Cuban Missile Crisis reached its breaking point, a miniature camera that was hidden in the ceiling of Penkovsky's apartment allowed the Chekists to see him examining the fake passport. Fearing that Penkovsky was preparing to leave the territory of the USSR, General Gribanov ordered his immediate arrest.
Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky ("Alex") was arrested on October 22, 1962, the day President Kennedy announced that the United States was in danger, putting its armed forces on full alert and beginning a blockade of Cuba.
The world is on the brink of destruction...
In the United States, the reality of war was so close that there was a discussion in the White House about the list of people admitted to the government shelter.
On October 27, 1962, Soviet air defense forces destroyed an American reconnaissance aircraft. It seemed that World War III had begun, but John F. Kennedy did not give the order to strike back - by that time he already had information that the USSR was simply bluffing and they still did not have the strength to deliver an irresistible nuclear missile strike on the United States ...
Khrushchev had no choice but to write his famous letter to President Kennedy, in which he agreed that "only a madman or a suicidal man who wants to die himself can wish to destroy your country."
Kennedy offered Khrushchev a deal: "Dismantle your rocket launch sites and we'll leave Cuba alone."
And the leader of the USSR had to agree, and the Caribbean crisis, which could develop into a third world war, passed.
The failure of Penkovsky in the CIA and the SIS became known only on November 2. On this day in Moscow, a conventional sign appeared on one of the lampposts, which meant that Penkovsky had left material for transmission in the "mailbox". The CIA officer who arrived at the cache was arrested by the KGB but claimed diplomatic immunity.
Penkovsky was brutally tortured during lengthy interrogations in an attempt to get the necessary information from him.
Explaining the reasons that prompted him to embark on the path of treason, Penkovsky testified during interrogation on January 12, 1963:
“... I was the bearer of many shortcomings: I was envious, selfish, vain, had careerist tendencies, loved to court women, had women with whom I cohabited, went to restaurants - in a word, I loved the easy life.
All these vices undermined me, and I broke loose, became a worthless person and a traitor. ten
Greville Wynn was arrested on November 2, 1962 in Budapest, "passed" through the trial, sentenced to eight years in prison and exchanged on April 22, 1964 for the Soviet intelligence officer Conon the Young, who was arrested in England in January 1961 under the name of Gordon Lonsdale.
At an open trial of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 11, 1963, Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky was found guilty of espionage, deprived of his military rank, all state awards and sentenced to death by firing squad (excerpts from the transcript of the trial can be read ).
The sentence was carried out in the Lubyanka prison in Moscow on May 16, 1963. The ashes of Penkovsky were allegedly buried in a mass grave in the cemetery of the Donskoy Monastery.
It is widely believed that Penkovsky was not shot, but burned alive in a crematorium oven. This whole procedure was filmed and shown to future scouts for intimidation. About this in his book "Aquarium", however, without indicating that it was Penkovsky, the former Soviet intelligence officer Viktor Suvorov (Rezun) wrote about this.
The same story is reproduced (possibly borrowed from Rezun) by Tom Clancy in the book “Red Rabbit”, as well as by Ernst Neizvestny, who was allegedly told this by the director of the Moscow crematorium over cognac in the 1970s.
In the leading article of the printed organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU - the newspaper "Pravda" dated May 17, 1963, the following was published:
“With great approval, the entire Soviet people met the just verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR in the criminal case of the traitor to the Motherland, the agent of British and American intelligence Penkovsky and the spy-communicator Wynn. Capital punishment - execution for Penkovsky and eight years in prison for Winn - such is the verdict of the court.
An endless stream of letters to the editorial office of Pravda, to other press organs and on the radio all these days, in which Soviet people of various professions and ages express a feeling of deep satisfaction that the glorious Soviet Chekists resolutely stopped the vile activities of British and American intelligence.
From the pages of these letters, the voice of the workers, agricultural workers, and Soviet intelligentsia resounds loudly, angrily stigmatizing the reactionary circles of the capitalist states, which are carrying out subversive activities against the Soviet Union.
... In our socialist society, degenerates like Penkovsky are doomed to general contempt, to destruction. 220 million Soviet patriots unanimously expressed their anger towards the traitor...” 9
Now let's talk about the unofficial version, which implies that Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky was a dummy KGB agent. For example, intelligence officer Anatoly Maksimov, who himself once played the role of a “Moscow agent” of Canadian counterintelligence, cites, though indirect, but still quite convincing evidence.
By the way, when preparing for the role of a double agent, Anatoly Maksimov was asked if he was ready to play the role of a traitor - with all the ensuing consequences. He was ready...
Penkovsky completely neglected his own safety, which was not at all characteristic of his then position (if one did not regard his work as dummy). He tried to establish contact with the Americans even in the Kremlin area, although he knew, of course, how hard surveillance works there.
Penkovsky handed over 5,000 frames of photographic film to the enemy’s special services, and this would have been quite enough, but he also brought original documents, which was practically impossible in the USSR.
Penkovsky, as a high-ranking employee of the State Committee for Science and Technology (cover position), could transfer materials during foreign business trips or through a messenger, but he did this through hiding places on the territory of the USSR.
After the exposure of her father, Penkovsky's own daughter worked in the information service of the First Main Directorate of the KGB (foreign intelligence). Knowledgeable people said that influential people in the special services helped her get settled.
It is quite possible that this was the condition of Oleg Penkovsky himself, who agreed to become a set-up.
Penkovsky's information was needed in order to show the "weakness" of the Union, and the USSR would continue to build its full-fledged nuclear shield behind this screen (which, by the way, was done later).
During the Caribbean crisis, Penkovsky's information about the Soviet military potential in Cuba was needed to legalize the very fact of the deployment of Soviet missiles there. There was a big bargaining, the meaning of which is simple: Americans, leave Cuba alone. And for a big bargain, a big bluff was needed ...
Colonel Penkovsky was arrested in mid-October 1962, when the Cuban Missile Crisis was at its peak. The then head of the KGB, Vladimir Semichastny, already said today that this arrest could have happened earlier, but he was ordered to leave Penkovsky alone for a while.
Perhaps this was done in order not to frighten off the Americans who worked with him.
In addition, Penkovsky had to "gather" more compromising material for a powerful political anti-American campaign. As a result, a dozen employees of the American embassy were expelled from the USSR.
Colonel Penkovsky was not shot - even if the global intelligence game had to be brought to its logical end.
There are many examples when participants in such games disappeared, and after a long time they suddenly “popped up”... 5
In fact, E. Verlier writes about the same thing in his book “Through the Looking Glass”:
“In the labyrinths of American intelligence, you can still find veterans who are still convinced that Penkovsky is a brilliant example of one of the most disgusting operations of the KGB” ...
The English newspaper The Sunday Telegraph on May 19, 1963, after Penkovsky's sentence was carried out, wrote: “Western officials in Moscow believe that the death sentence for Oleg Penkovsky is a pure fake. As one diplomat put it, Penkovsky's execution "consisted in the fact that his passport was destroyed, and in return he was given another one." eleven

Viktor Suvorov (Rezun), a former Soviet intelligence officer who fled to the UK, has his own opinion:
“Question one. Why didn't Penkovsky run away abroad?
... If he liked women, to drink and take a walk, then he still could not spend the money received for espionage in Moscow. We all lived in standard Soviet conditions, and the appearance of an extra ten in the pocket, even of a colonel, would have been noted by other colonels. The payment for the information that he managed to convey would have been enough for Penkovsky for life, but for some reason he did not run away, but preferred to remain in the USSR.
And another mystery. The colonel transmitted information of particular importance and secrecy. But he did not and could not have access to this information. Where did he get this information from?
When we delve into these issues, we find open evidence that Colonel Penkovsky did not act on his own, but on orders from above. Thus, the Central organ of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, in its issue of January 29, 1997, writes about the head of the GRU, General of the Army Serov. And he reports that it was he who introduced Penkovsky to the State Committee on Science and Technology with the task of "entering the confidence of the American and British agents in Moscow." 6
At that time, the Soviet Union lagged behind America in nuclear warheads by 17 times, in strategic bombers by several hundred times, by submarines with a nuclear charge on board - 9 times!
At the same time, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev constantly threatened to destroy the United States, that is, he constantly bluffed corny, and the US leadership, taking all this for truth, was already preparing to deliver a warning nuclear strike on the USSR ...
Therefore, some leaders of the Armed Forces of the USSR, in particular the head of the GRU, General of the Army Serov Ivan Alexandrovich, the head of the Main Directorate of Missile Forces and Artillery (GRAU), Chief Marshal of Artillery Sergey Sergeevich Varentsov, and, possibly, Marshal of the Soviet Union Biryuzov, realized the need to stop this threat of nuclear conflict and convey to the leadership of the United States the true state of affairs.
“But how to convey this information to the Americans? How to get through to them? And it turns out that the generals have the only opportunity - to find a good combat officer, order him to pretend to be a traitor and pass on to the Americans such information that they could verify ...
The chief of the GRU of the General Staff, General of the Army Serov, was looking for a candidate who could pass on information. And his colleague in the conspiracy was Chief Marshal of Artillery Varentsov. He was looking for his candidate.
Both settled on Colonel Penkovsky.
... Penkovsky got in touch with the Americans - they did not believe him, so he got in touch with the British and gave all the data to them. And the British have already convinced the Americans.
That is why it turned out that he worked simultaneously for two intelligence agencies.
...Usually Chekists willingly tell how they figured out this or that traitor. And here - silence. Because there was a second conspiracy. American conspiracy against Penkovsky.
He, as we know, met with the British on April 12, and in December 1961 - January 1962 he was already identified by the Chekists, and "tails" were attached behind him. They followed very closely. The question is how did you know?
Very simple. There was a leak of information from American sources in the KGB.
What happened to the conspirators? Have they gotten away with it all?
It is impossible to announce that there was a conspiracy, this is a shame for the country. Therefore, Serov was accused not of being a conspirator, but of losing his vigilance, and on that basis he was demoted. They made him a major general, sent him to the provinces, and stripped him of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Varentsov was also stripped of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and the title of Chief Marshal of Artillery - demoted to major general.
But behind them stood another person who was not as lit up as they were - Sergei Semenovich Biryuzov, Marshal of the Soviet Union.
They are all Khrushchev's nominees. Khrushchev knew Serov since 1940 in Kyiv, he was the People's Commissar of the NKVD of Ukraine, and Khrushchev was the first secretary of the Central Committee of Ukraine. Khrushchev knew Varentsov from the war. Biryuzova - from the war. This is one group.
They knew Khrushchev's plans, but could not object to him, so they secretly frustrated these plans.
Biryuzov in this case did not light up in any way, but he is an important participant in the conspiracy, the commander-in-chief of the Strategic Missile Forces. And Khrushchev makes an unexpected move, appointing him chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.
From this moment begins the fall of Khrushchev. 6
Former CIA chief Richard Helms, speaking to reporters in 1971, said that several high-ranking officials from the Soviet Union helped prevent a third world war. Under pressure from journalists, he named one of them - Oleg Penkovsky. The rest "open" flatly refused ...
So who was he - Colonel Penkovsky - an ordinary traitor or still a hero who saved the world?
Unfortunately, the truth is still kept in the secret archives of the GRU and the FSB...

Information sources:
1. Wikipedia site
2. Andrew, Gordievsky "KGB: the history of foreign policy operations from Lenin to Gorbachev"
3. "New Encyclopedic Dictionary" (Ripol Classic, 2006)
4. Galuzinskaya "Dream Spy"
5. "Spy Oleg Penkovsky: we will not know the truth"
6. Gokhman “Conspiracy of Marshals. Victor Suvorov: "Oleg Penkovsky - a traitor or a hero?"
7. Chertoprud "The Spy Who Became a Cold War Myth"
8. CIA Walk of Fame. Part II - Colonel Oleg Penkovsky "(CIA official website)
9. Leading article of the Pravda newspaper, May 17, 1963
10. “Litigation in the criminal case of an agent of the British and American intelligence services, a citizen of the USSR Penkovsky O.V. and spy-liaison filed by Great Britain Wynn G.M. (Political literature edition, Moscow, 1963)
11. “The tail of the old fox” Interview of the Chief Military Prosecutor, Lieutenant General of Justice A. G. Gorny, to Izvestia correspondents (Izvestia newspaper, May 29, 1963).